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Abstract
The goal of the paper is to develop the theory of finite state mean field games with major and
minor players when the state space of the game is finite. We introduce the finite player games and
derive a mean field game formulation in the limit when the number of minor players tends to infinity.
In this limit, we prove that the value functions of the optimization problems are viscosity solutions of
PIDEs of the HJB type, and we construct the best responses for both types of players. From there,
we prove existence of Nash equilibria under reasonable assumptions. Finally we prove that a form of
propagation of chaos holds in the present context and use this result to prove existence of approximate
Nash equilibria for the finite player games from the solutions of the mean field games. this vindicate
our formulation of the mean field game problem.
1 Introduction
Mean field games with major and minor players were introduced to accommodate the presence of sub-
groups of players whose influence on the behavior of the remaining population does not vanish in the
asymptotic regime of large games. In this paper we develop the theory of these dynamic games when the
optimization problems faced by the players are over the dynamics of continuous time controlled processes
with values in finite state spaces. The theory of finite state mean field games for a single homogeneous
population of players was introduced in [11, 12] and [10]. The interested reader may also consult Chapter
7 of the book [4] for a complete presentation of the theory. The present paper is concerned with the
extension to models with major and minor players. We search for closed loop Nash equilibria and for this
reason, we use the approach which was advocated in [6], and called an alternative approach in Chapter
13 of [5].
Our interest in mean field games with major and minor players when the state space is finite was
sparked by the four state model [15] for the behavior of computer owners facing cyber attacks. Even
though the model was not introduced and treated as a game with major and minor players, clearly, it is
of this type if the behaviors of the attacker and the targets are strategic. Practical applications amenable
to these models abound and a better theoretical understanding of their structures should lead to sorely
needed numerical procedures to compute Nash equilibria.
Early forms of mean field games with major and minor players appeared in [13] in an infinite-horizon
setting, in [18] for finite time horizons, and [20] offered a first generalization to non linear-quadratic
cases. In these models, the state of the major player does not enter the dynamics of the states of the
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minor players: it only appears in their cost functionals. this was remedied in [19] for linear quadratic
models. The asymmetry between major and minor players was emphasized in [2] where the authors
insist on the fact that the statistical distribution of the state of a generic minor player should be derived
endogenously. Like [17], [2] characterizes the limiting problem by a set of stochastic partial differential
equations. However, [2] seems to be solving a Stackelberg game, and only the population of minor players
ends up in a Nash equilibrium. this is in contrast with [7] which also insists on the endogenous nature
of the statical distribution of the state of a generic minor player, but which formulates the search for a
mean field equilibrium as the search for a Nash equilibrium in a two player game over the time evolutions
of states, some of which being of a McKean-Vlasov type. The recent technical report [14] adds a major
player to the particular case (without idiosyncratic random shocks) of extended mean field game model
of optimal execution introduced in Chapter 1 and solved in Chapter 4 of [4].
In this paper, we cast the search for Nash equilibria as a search for fixed points of the best response
function constructed from the optimization problems of both types of players. Typically, in a mean field
game with major and minor players, the dynamics of the state X0t of the major player (as well as its
costs) depend upon the statistical distribution µt of the state Xt of a generic minor player. Throughout
the paper we consider that the players are gender neutral and we use ”its” instead of ”his” or ”her”.
Alternatively, the dynamics of the state Xt of a generic minor player (as well as its costs) depend upon
the values of the state X0t and the control α
0
t of the major player as well as the statistical distribution
µt which captures the mean field interactions between the minor players. In this paper, we prove that he
processes (X0t , µt) and (X
0
t ,Xt, µt) are Markovian and we characterize their laws by their infinitesimal
generators. We start from the finite player version of the model and show convergence when the number
of minor players goes to infinity. We rely on standard results on the convergence of Markov semigroups.
Note that the control of the major player implicitly influences µt through the major player’s state, so the
major player’s optimization problem should be treated as an optimal control problem for McKean-Vlasov
dynamics. On the other hand, for the representative minor player’s problem, we are just dealing with a
classical Markov decision problem in continuous time. this allows us to adapt to the finite state space the
approach introduced in [6] and reviewed in Chapter 13 of [5], to define and construct Nash equilibria. We
emphasize that these are Nash equilibria for the whole system Major + Minor Players and not only for
the minor players. this is fully justified by our results on the propagation of chaos and their applications
to the proof that our mean field game equilibria provide approximate Nash equilibria for finite games,
including both major and minor players.
The paper is structured as follows. Games with finitely many minor players and a major player are
introduced in Section 2 where we explain the conventions and notations we use to describe continuous
time controlled Markov processes in finite state spaces. We also identify the major and minor players
by specifying the information structures available to them, the types of actions they can take, and the
costs they incur. The short and non-technical Section 3 describes the mean field game strategy and
emphasizes the steps needed in the search for Nash equilibria for the system. this is in contrast with
some earlier works where the formulation of the problem lead to Stackelberg equilibria, only the minor
players being in an approximate Nash equilibrium. To keep with the intuition that the mean field game
strategy is to implement a form of limit when the number of minor players grows to infinity, Section
4 considers the convergence of the state Markov processes in this limit, and identifies the optimization
problems which the major and minor players need to solve in order to construct their best responses.
this leads to the formalization of the search for a mean field equilibrium as the search of fixed points
for the best response map so constructed. The optimization problems underpinning the definition of the
best response map are studied in Section 5. There, we use dynamic programming to prove that the value
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functions of these optimization problems are viscosity solutions of HJB type Partial Integro - Differential
Equations (PIDEs). Section 6 proves existence of the best response map and of Nash equilibria under
reasonable conditions. Next, Section 7 gives a verification theorem based on the existence of a classical
solution to the master equation. The longer Section 8 proves that the solution of the mean field game
problem provides approximate Nash equilibria for the finite player games. this vindicates our formulation
as the right formulation of the problem if the goal is to find Nash equilibria for the system including both
major and minor players. The strategy of the proof in by now standard in the literature on mean field
games. It relies on propagation of chaos results. However, the latter are usually derived for stochastic
differential systems with mean field interactions, and because we could not find the results we needed
in the existing literature, we provide proofs of the main steps of the derivations of these results in the
context of controlled Markov evolutions in finite state spaces. Finally, an appendix provides the proofs
of some of the technical results we used in the text.
2 Game Model with Finitely Many Players
We consider a stochastic game in continuous time, involving a major player indexed by 0, and N minor
players indexed from 1 to N . The states of all the players X0t ,X
1
t , . . . ,X
N
t are described by a continuous-
time finite-state Markov process. Let us denote {1, 2, . . . ,M0} the set of possible states of the major
player, and {1, 2, . . . ,M} the set of possible states of the minor players. We introduce the empirical
distribution of the states of the minor players at time t:
µNt = [
1
N
N∑
n=1
1(Xnt = 1),
1
N
N∑
n=1
1(Xnt = 2), . . . ,
1
N
N∑
n=1
1(Xnt =M − 1)]
We denote by P the (M − 1) - dimensional simplex:
P := {x ∈ RM−1|xi ≥ 0,
∑
xi ≤ 1}.
Obviously, µNt ∈ P. We consider continuous-time Markov dynamics according to which the rates of
jump, say q, of the state of a generic minor player depends upon the value of its control, the empirical
distribution of the states of all the minor players, as well as the major player’s control and state. We
denote by A0 (resp. A) a convex set in which the major player (resp. all the minor players) can choose
their controls. So we introduce a function q:
[0, T ]× {1, . . . ,M}2 ×A× {1, . . . ,M0} ×A0 × P ∋ (t, i, j, α, i0 , α0, x)→ q(t, i, j, α, i0 , α0, x)
and we make the following assumption on q:
Hypothesis 1. For all (t, α, i0, α0, x) ∈ [0, T ] × A × {1, . . . ,M0} × A0 × P, the matrix
[q(t, i, j, α, i0 , α0, x)]1≤i,j≤M is a Q-matrix.
Recall that a matrix Q = [Q(i, j)]i,j is said to be a Q-matrix if Q(i, j) ≥ 0 for i 6= j and∑
j 6=i
Q(i, j) = −Q(i, i), for all i.
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Then we assume that at time t if the state of minor player n is i, this state will jump from i to j at a
rate given by:
q(t, i, j, αnt ,X
0
t , α
0
t , µ
N
t )
if X0t is the major player state, α
0
t ∈ A0 is the major player control, αnt ∈ A is the n-th minor player
control and µNt ∈ P is the empirical distribution of the minor player’s states. Our goal is to use these
rates to completely specify the law of a continuous time process in the following way: if at time t the
n-th minor player is in state i and uses control αnt , if the major player is in state X
0
t and uses the control
α0t , and if the empirical distribution of the states of the population of minor players is µ
N
t , then the
probability of player n remaining in the same state during the infinitesimal time interval [t, t + ∆t) is
[1 + q(t, i, i, αnt ,X
0
t , α
0
t , µ
N
t )∆t+ o(∆t)], whereas the probability of this state changing to another state j
during the same time interval is given by [q(t, i, j, αnt ,X
0
t , α
0
t , µ
N
t )∆t+ o(∆t)].
Similarly, to describe the evolution of the state of the major player we introduce a function q0:
[0, T ]× {1, . . . ,M0}2 ×A0 × P ∋ (t, i0, j0, α0, x)→ q0(t, i0, j0, α0, x)
which satisfies the following assumption:
Hypothesis 2. For each (t, α0, x) ∈ [0, T ]×A0 × P, [q0(t, i0, j0, α0, x)]1≤i0,j0≤M0 is a Q-matrix.
So if at time t the state of the major player is i0, its control is α0t ∈ A0, and the empirical distribution
of the states of the minor players is µNt , we assume the state of the major player will jump to state j
0 at
rate q0(t, i0, j0, α0t , µ
N
t ).
We now define the control strategies which are admissible to the major and minor players. In our
model, we assume that the major player can only observe its own state and the empirical distribution
of the states of the minor players, whereas each minor player can observe its own state, the state of the
major player as well as the empirical distribution of the states of all the minor players. Furthermore, we
only allow for Markov strategies given by feedback functions. Therefore the major player’s control should
be of the form α0t = φ
0(t,X0t , µ
N
t ) for some feedback function φ
0 : [0, T ] × {1, · · · ,M0} × P 7→ A0, and
the control of minor player n should be of the form αnt = φ
n(t,Xnt ,X
0
t .µ
N
t ) for some feedback function
φn : [0, T ]× {1, · · · ,M} × {1, · · · ,M0} × P 7→ A. We denote the sets of admissible control strategies by
A˚0 and A˚n respectively. Depending upon the application, we may add more restrictive conditions to the
definitions of these sets of admissible control strategies.
We now define the joint dynamics of the states of all the players. We assume that conditioned on
the current state of the system, the changes of states are independent for different players. this means
that for all i0, i1, . . . , iN and j0, j1, . . . , jN , where i0, j0 ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M0} and in, jn ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M} for
n = 1, 2, . . . , N , we have:
P[X0t+∆t = j
0,X1t+∆t = j
1, . . . ,XNt+∆t = j
N |X0t = i0,X1t = i1, . . . ,XNt = iN ]
:= [1i0=j0 + q
0(t, i0, j0, φ0(t, i0, µNt ), µ
N
t )∆t+ o(∆t)]
×
N∏
n=1
[1in=jn + q
n(t, in, jn, φn(t, in, i0, µNt ), i
0, φ0(t, i0, µNt ), µ
N
t )∆t+ o(∆t)]
Formally, this statement is equivalent to the definition of the Q-matrix , say Q(N) of the continuous-time
Markov chain (X0t ,X
1
t ,X
2
t , . . . X
N
t ). The state space of this Markov chain is the Cartesian product of
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each player’s state space. Therefore Q(N) is a square matrix of size M0 ·MN . The non-diagonal entry
of Q(N) can be found by simply retaining the first order term in ∆t when expanding the above product
of probabilities. Because we assume that the transitions of states are independent among the individual
players, Q(N) is a sparse matrix.
Each individual player aims to minimize its expected cost in the game. We assume that these costs
are given by:
J0,N (α0, α1, . . . , αN ) := E
[∫ T
0
f0(t,X0t , φ
0(t,X0t , µ
N
t ), µ
N
t )dt+ g
0(X0T , µ
N
T )
]
Jn,N (α0, α1, . . . , αN ) := E
[∫ T
0
fn(t,Xnt , φ
n(t,Xnt ,X
0
t , µ
N
t ),X
0
t , φ
0(t,X0t , µ
N
t ), µ
N
t )dt+ g
n(XnT ,X
0
T , µ
N
T )
]
.
In this paper, we focus on the special case of symmetric games, for which all the minor players share the
same transition rate function and cost function, i.e.: qn := q, fn := f , gn := g, Jn,N := JN , and we search
for symmetric Nash equilibria. We say that a couple of feedback functions (φ0, φ) form a symmetric Nash
equilibrium if the controls (α0,α1, · · · ,αN ) given by α0t = φ0(t,X0t , µNt ) and αnt = φ(t,Xnt ,X0t , µNt ) for
n = 1, · · · , N , form a Nash equilibrium in the sense that:
J0,N (α0,α1, . . . ,αN ) ≤ J0,N (α′,α1, . . . ,αN )
JN (α0,α1, . . . ,αn, . . .αN ) ≤ JN (α0,α1, . . . ,α′n, . . .αN )
for any choices of alternative admissible controls α
′0 and α
′n of the forms α
′0
t = φ
′0(t,X0t , µ
N
t ) and
α
′n
t = φ
′(t,Xnt ,X
0
t , µ
N
t ). In order to simplify the notation, we will systematically use the following
notations when there is no risk of possible confusion. When α0 ∈ A0 is given by a feedback function φ0
and α ∈ A is given by a feedback fucntion φ, we denote by q0φ0 , qφ0,φ, f0φ0 and fφ0,φ the functions:
q0φ0(t, i
0, j0, x) := q0(t, i0, j0, φ0(t, i0, x), x)
qφ0,φ(t, i, j, i
0, x) := q(t, i, j, φ(t, i, i0 , x), i0, φ0(t, i0, x), x)
f0φ0(t, i
0, x) := f0(t, i0, φ0(t, i0, x), x)
fφ0,φ(t, i
0, i, x) := f(t, i, φ(t, i, i0, x), i0, φ0(t, i0, x), x)
3 Mean Field Game Formulation
Solving for Nash equilibria when the number of players is finite is challenging. There are many reasons
why the problem becomes quickly intractable. Among them is the fact that as the number of minor
players increases, the dimension of the Q - matrix of the system increases exponentially. The paradigm
of Mean Field Games consists in the analysis of the limiting case where the number N of minor players
tends to infinity. In this asymptotic regime, one expects that simplifications due to averaging effects will
make it easier to find asymptotic solutions which could provide approximative equilibria for finite player
games when the number N of minor players is large enough. The rationale for such a belief is based
on the intuition provided by classical results on the propagation of chaos for large particle systems with
mean field interactions. We developed these results later in the paper.
The advantage of considering the limit case is two-fold. First, when N goes to infinity, the empirical
distribution of the minor players’ states converges to a random measure µt which we expect to be the
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conditional distribution of any minor player’s state, i.e.:
µNt → µt :=
(
P[Xnt = 1|X0t ],P[Xnt = 2|X0t ], . . . ,P[Xnt =M − 1|X0t ]
)
.
As we shall see later on in the next section, when considered together with the major player’s state and
one of the minor player’s state, the resulting process is Markovian and its infinitesimal generator has a
tractable form. Also, when the number of minor players goes to infinity, small perturbations of a single
minor player’s strategy will have no significant influence on the distribution of minor player’s states. this
gives rise to a simple formulation of the typical minor player’s search for the best response to the control
choices of the major player. In the limit N → ∞, we understand a Nash equilibrium as a situation
in which neither the major player, nor a typical minor player could be better off by changing control
strategy. In order to formulate this limiting problem, we need to define the joint dynamics of the states
of the major player and a representative minor player, making sure that the dynamics of the state of
the major player depend upon the statistical distribution of the states of the minor players, and that the
dynamics of the state of the representative minor player depend upon the values of the state and the
control of the major player, its own state, and the statistical distribution of the states of all the minor
players.
As argued in [6], and echoed in Chapter 13 of [5], the best way to search for Nash equilibria in the
mean field limit of games with major and minor players is first to identify the best response map of the
major and a representative of the minor players by solving the optimization problems for the strategies of
1) the major player in response to the field of minor players as represented by a special minor player with
special state dynamics which we call a representative minor player, and 2) the representative minor player
in response to the behavior of the major player and the other minor players. Solving these optimization
problems separately provides a definition of the best response map for the system. One can then search
for a fixed point for this best response map. So the search for Nash equilibria for the mean field game
with major and minor players can be summarized in the following two steps.
Step 1 (Identifying the Best Response Map)
1.1 (Major Player’s Problem)
Fix an admissible strategy α ∈ A of the form αt = φ(t,Xt,X0t , µt) for the representative minor player,
solve for the optimal control problem of the major player given that all the minor players use the feedback
function φ. We denote by φ0,∗(φ) the feedback function giving the optimal strategy of this optimization
problem.
Notice that, in order to formulate properly this optimization problem, we need to define Markov
dynamics for the couple (X0t ,Xt) where Xt is interpreted as the state of a representative minor player,
and the (random) measure µt has to be defined clearly. this is done in the next section as the solution of
the major player optimization problem, the Markovian dynamics being obtained from the limit of games
with N minor players.
1.2 (Representative Minor Player’s Problem)
We first single out a minor player and we search for its best response to the rest of the other players.
So we fix an admissible strategy α0 ∈ A0 of the form α0t = φ0(t,X0t , µt) for the major player, and an
admissible strategy α ∈ A˚ of the form αt = φ(t,Xt,X0t , µt) for the representative of the remaining minor
players. We then assume that the minor player which we singled out responds to the other players by
choosing an admissible strategy α¯ ∈ A˚ of the form α¯t = φ¯(t, øXt,X0t , µt). Clearly, if we want to find the
best response of the singled out minor player to the behavior of the major player and the field of the other
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minor players as captured by the behavior of the representative minor player, we need to define Markov
dynamics for the triple (X0t , øXt,Xt), and define clearly what we mean by the (random) measure µt.
this is done in the next section as the solution of the representative minor player optimization problem,
the Markovian dynamics being obtained from the limit of games with N minor players. We denote by
φ∗(φ0, φ) the feedback function giving the optimal strategy of this optimization problem.
Step 2 (Search for a Fixed Point of the Best Response Map)
A Nash equilibrium for the mean field game with major and minor players is a fixed point [φˆ0, φˆ] =
[φ0,∗(φˆ),φ∗(φˆ0, φˆ)].
Clearly, in order to take Step 1, we need to formulate properly the search for these two best responses,
and study the limit N →∞ of both cases of interest.
4 Convergence of Large Finite Player Games
Throughout the rest of the paper, we make the following assumptions on the regularity of the transition
rate and cost functions:
Hypothesis 3. There exists a constant L > 0 such that for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, i0, j0 ∈ {1, . . . ,M0}
and all t, t′ ∈ [0, T ], x, x′ ∈ P, α0, α0′ ∈ A0 and α,α′ ×A, we have:
|(f, f0, g, g0, q, q0)(i, j, i0 , j0, t, x, α0, α) − (f, f0, g, g0, q, q0)(i, j, i0, j0, t′, x′, α0′ , α′)|
≤ L(|t− t′|+ ‖x− x′‖+ ‖α0 − α0′‖+ ‖α − α′‖)
Hypothesis 4. There exists a constant C > 0 such that for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, i0 ∈ {1, . . . ,M0} and
all t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ P, α0 ∈ A0 and α ∈ A, we have:
|q(t, i, j, α, i0 , α0, x)| ≤ C
Finally, we add a boundary condition on the Markov evolution of the minor players. Intuitively
speaking, this assumption rules out extinction: it says that a minor player can no longer change its state,
when the percentage of minor players who are in the same state falls below a certain threshold.
Hypothesis 5. There exists a constant ǫ > 0 such that for all t ∈ [0, T ], i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,M − 1}, i 6= j and
α0 ∈ A0 and α ∈ A, we have:
xi < ǫ =⇒ q(t, i, j, α, i0 , α0, x) = 0
1−
M−1∑
k=1
xk < ǫ =⇒ q(t,M, i, α, i0 , α0, x) = 0.
The purpose of this section is to identify the state dynamics which should be posited in the formulation
of the mean field game problem with major and minor players. In order to do so, we formulate the search
for the best response of each player by first setting the game with finitely many minor players, and then
letting the number of minor players go to∞ to identify the dynamics over which the best response should
be computed in the limit.
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4.1 Major Player’s Problem with Finitely Many Minor Players
For any integer N (fixed for the moment), we consider a game with N minor players, and we compute
the best response of the major player when the minor players choose control strategies αn = (αnt )0≤t≤T
given by the same feedback function φ so that αnt = φ(t,X
n,N
t ,X
0,N
t , µ
N
t ) for n = 1, · · · , N . Here Xn,Nt
denotes the state of the n-th minor player at time t, X0,Nt the state of the major player, and µ
N
t the
empirical distribution of the states of the N minor players at time t. The latter is a probability measure
on the state space E = {1, · · · ,M}, and for the sake of convenience, we shall identify it with the element:
µNt =
1
N
( N∑
n=1
1(Xn,Nt = 1),
N∑
n=1
1(Xn,Nt = 2), . . . ,
N∑
n=1
1(Xn,Nt =M − 1)
)
of the simplex. So for each i ∈ E, µNt (i) is the proportion of minor players whose state at time t is equal
to i. Consequently, for N fixed, µNt can be viewed as an element of the finite space {0, 1/N, · · · , (N −
1)/N, 1}M−1. For the sake of definiteness, we denote by PN the set of possible values of µNt , in other
words, we set:
PN := { 1
N
(n1, n2, . . . nM−1); ni ∈ N,
∑
i
ni ≤ N
}
.
Given the choice of control strategies made by the minor players, we denote by α0 = (α0t )0≤t≤T the
control strategy of the major player, and we study the time evolution of the state of the system given
these choices of control strategies. Later on, we shall find the optimal choice for major player’s controls α0
given by feedback functions φ0 in response to the choice of the feedback function φ of the minor players.
While this optimization should be done over the dynamics of the whole state (X0,Nt ,X
1,N
t , · · · ,XN,Nt ),
we notice that the process (X0,Nt , µ
N
t )0≤t≤T is sufficient to define the optimization problem of the major
player, and that it is also a continuous time Markov process in the finite state space {1, . . . ,M0} × PN .
Our goal is to show that as N →∞, the Markov process (X0,Nt , µNt )0≤t≤T converges in some sense to
a Markov process (X0t , µt)0≤t≤T . This will allow us to formulate the optimization problem of the major
player in the mean field limit in terms of this limiting Markov process.
For each integerN , we denote by G0,N
φ0,φ
the infinitesimal generator of the Markov process (X0,Nt , µ
N
t )0≤t≤T .
Since the process is not time homogeneous, when we say infinitesimal generator, we mean the infinitesimal
generator of the space-time process (t,X0,Nt , µ
N
t )0≤t≤T . Except for the partial derivative with respect to
time, this infinitesimal generator is given by the Q-matrix of the process, namely the instantaneous rates
of jump in the state space {1, . . . ,M0} × PN . So if F : [0, T ]× {1, 2, . . . ,M0} × PN → R is C1 in time,
[G0,N
φ0,φ
F ](t, i0, x) = ∂tF (t, i
0, x) +
∑
j0 6=i0
(
F (t, j0, x)− F (t, i0, x))q0φ0(t, i0, j0, x)
+
∑
j 6=i
(
F (t, i0, x+
1
N
eij)− F (t, i0, x)
)
Nxiqφ0,φ(t, i, j, i
0, x),
(1)
where the first summation in the right hand side corresponds to jumps in the state of the major player
and the terms in the second summation account for the jumps of the state of one minor player from i
to j. Here we code the change in the empirical distribution x of the states of the minor players caused
by the jump from i ∈ {1, · · · ,M} to j ∈ {1, · · · ,M} with j 6= i, of the state of a single minor player as
(1/N)eij with the notation eij := ej1j 6=M − ei1i 6=M where ei stands for the i-th vector in the canonical
basis of the space RM−1. We have also used the notation xn = 1−
∑n−1
i=1 xi for sake of simplicity.
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Notice that the two summations appearing in (1) correspond to finite difference operators which are
bounded. So the domain of the operator G0,N
φ0,φ
is nothing else than the domain of the partial derivative
with respect to time. Notice also that the sequence of generators G0,N
φ0,φ
converges, at least formally, toward
a limit which can easily be identified. Indeed, it is clear from the definition (1) that [G0,N
φ0,φ
F ](t, i0, x) still
makes sense if x ∈ P, where P is theM−1 dimensional simplex. Moreover, if F : [0, T ]×{1, 2, . . . ,M0}×
P → R is C1 in both variables t and x, we have [G0,N
φ0,φ
F ](t, i0, x)→ [G0φ0,φF ](t, i0, x) defined by:
[G0φ0,φF ](t, i0, x) := ∂tF (t, i0, x) +
∑
j0 6=i0
[F (t, j0, x)− F (t, i0, x)]q0φ0(t, i0, j0, x)
+
M−1∑
i,j=1
∂xjF (t, i
0, x)xiqφ0,φ(t, i, j, i
0, x) + (1−
M−1∑
k=1
xk)
M−1∑
j=1
∂xjF (t, i
0, x)qφ0,φ(t,M, j, i
0, x).
So far, we have a sequence of time-inhomogeneous Markov processes (X0,Nt , µ
N
t ) characterized by their
infinitesimal generators G0,N
φ0,φ
which converge to G0φ0,φ. We now aim to show the existence of a limiting
Markov process with infinitesimal generator G0φ0,φ. The proof consists of first showing the existence of a
Feller semigroup generated by the limiting generator G0φ0,φ, and then applying an argument of convergence
of semigroups.
Remark 1. The standard results in the theory of semigroup are tailor-made for time-homogeneous
Markov processes. However, they can easily be adapted to the case of time-inhomogeneous Markov process
by simply considering the space-time expansion, specifically by augmenting the process (X0,Nt , µ
N
t ) into
(t,X0,Nt , µ
N
t ) and considering the uniform convergence on all bounded time intervals.
Let us introduce some notations which are useful for the functional analysis of the infinitesimal
generators and their corresponding semigroups. We set EN = [0, T ] × {1, . . . ,M0} × PN and E∞ =
[0, T ] × {1, . . . ,M0} × P for the state spaces, and we denote by C(E∞) the Banach space for the norm
‖F‖∞ = supt,i0,x |F (t, i0, x)|, of the real valued continuous functions defined on E∞. We also denote by
C1(E∞) the collection of functions in C(E∞) that are C1 in t and x for all i0 ∈ {1, . . . ,M0}.
Note that the Markov process (t,X0,Nt , µ
N
t ) lives in E
N while the candidate limiting process (t,X0,Nt , µ
N
t )
lives in E∞. The difference is that µNt only takes values in PN , which is a finite subset of P. Thus if
we want to show the convergence, we need to reset all the processes on the same state space, and our
first step should be to extend the definition of (t,X0,Nt , µ
N
t ) to a Markov process taking value in E
∞. To
do so, we extend the definition of the generator G0,N
φ0,φ
to accommodate functions F defined on the whole
E∞:
[G0,N
φ0,φ
F ](t, i0, x) = ∂tF (t, i
0, x) +
∑
j0 6=i0
(
F (t, j0, x)− F (t, i0, x))q0φ0(t, i0, j0, x)
+
∑
j 6=i
(
F (t, i0, x+
1
N
eij)− F (t, i0, x)
)
Nxi1xi≥ 1N
qφ0,φ(t, i, j, i
0, x).
We claim that for N large enough, G0,N
φ0,φ
generates a Markov process with a Feller semigroup taking
values in E∞. Indeed, when the initial distribution is a probability measure on {1, . . . ,M0} × PN , the
process has exactly the same law as (X0,Nt , µ
N
t ). To see why this is true, let us denote for all x ∈ P the
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set PNx := (x + 1NZM−1) ∩ P. Then we can construct a Markov process starting from (i, x) and living
in the space of finite states {1, . . . ,M} × PNx , which has the same transition rates as those appearing in
the definition of G0,N
φ0,φ
. In particular, the indicator function 1xi≥ 1N
forbids the component x to exit the
domain P. Hypothesis 5 implies that the transition function is continuous on E when N ≥ 1/ǫ, where ǫ
is the extinction threshold in the assumption. So this process is a continuous time Markov process with
continuous probability kernel in a compact space. By Proposition 4.4 in [21], it is a Feller process. In the
following, we will still denote this extended version of the process as (X0,Nt , µ
N
t ).
Proposition 1. There exists a Feller semigroup T = (Tt)t≥0 on the space C(E∞) such that the closure
of G0φ0,φ is the infinitesimal generator of T .
Proof. We use a simple perturbation argument. Observe that G0φ0,φ is the sum of two linear operator
H and K on C(E∞):
[HF ](t, i0, x) :=∂tF (t, i0, x) + v(t, i0, x) · ∇F (t, i0, x)
[KF ](t, i0, x) :=
∑
j0 6=i0
[F (t, j0, x)− F (t, i0, x)]q0φ0(t, i0, j0, x)
where we denote by ∇F (t, i0, x) the gradient of F with respect to x, and by v the vector field:
vj(t, i
0, x) :=
M−1∑
i=1
xiqφ0,φ(t, i, j, i
0, x) +
(
1−
M−1∑
i=1
xi
)
qφ0,φ(t,M, j, i
0, x).
Being a finite difference operator, K is a bounded operator on C(E∞) so the proof reduces to showing
that H generates a Feller semigroup. See for example Theorem 7.1, Chapter 1 in [8]. To show that the
closure of H generates a strongly continuous semigroup on C(E∞) we use the characteristics of the vector
field v. For any (t, i0, x) ∈ E∞, let (Y t,i0,xu )u≥0 be the solution of the Ordinary Differential Equation
(ODE):
dY t,i
0,x
u = v(t+ u, i
0, Y t,i
0,x
u )du, Y
t,i0,x
0 = x.
Existence and uniqueness of solutions are guaranteed by the Lipschitz property of the vector field v,
which in turn is a consequence of the Lipschitz property of qφ0,φ. Notice that by Hypothesis 5, the
process Y t,i
0,x
u is confined to P. So we can define the linear operator Ts on C(E∞):
[TsF ](t, i0, x) := F (s+ t, i0, Y t,i0,xs )
Uniqueness of solutions implies that (Ts)s≥0 is a semigroup. The latter is strongly continuous. Indeed,
by the boundedness of v, for a fixed h > 0, there exists a constant C0 such that |Y t,i
0,x
s − x| ≤ C0s for
all s ≤ h and (t, i0, x) ∈ E∞. Combining this estimation with the fact that F is uniformly continuous
in (t, x) for all F ∈ C(E∞), we obtain that ‖TsF − F‖ → 0, s → 0. Finally the semigroup T is Feller,
since the solution of ODE Y t,i
0,x
s depends continuously on the initial condition as a consequence of the
Lipschitz property of the vector field v.
It is plain to check that H is the infinitesimal generator of the semigroup T , and the domain of H is
C1(E∞).
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The following lemma is a simple adaptation of Theorem 6.1, Chapter 1 in [8] and is an important
ingredient in the proof of the convergence. It says that the convergence of the infinitesimal generators
implies the convergence of the corresponding semigroups.
Lemma 1. For N = 1, 2, . . . , let {TN (t)} and {T (t)} be strongly continuous contraction semigroups on L
with generator GN and G respectively. Let D be a core for G and assume that D ⊂ D(GN ) for all N ≥ 1.
If limN→∞ GNF = GF for all F ∈ D, then for each F ∈ L, limN→∞ TN (t)F = T (t)F for all t ≥ 0.
We are now ready to state and prove the main result of this section: the Markov process (X0,Nt , µ
N
t )
describing the dynamics of the state of the major player and the empirical distribution of the states of
the N minor players converges weakly to a Markov process with infinitesimal generator G0φ0,φ, when the
players choose Lipschitz strategies.
Theorem 1. Assume that the major player chooses a control strategy α0 given by a Lipschitz feedback
function φ0 and that all the minor players choose control strategies given by the same Lipschitz feedback
function φ. Let i0 ∈ {1, . . . ,M0} and for each integer N ≥ 1, xN ∈ PN with limit x ∈ P. Then the
sequence of processes (X0,Nt , µ
N
t ) with initial conditions X
0,N
0 = i
0, µNt = x
N converges weakly to a
Markov process (X0t , µt) with initial condition X
0
0 = i
0, µ0 = x. The infinitesimal generator for (X
0
t , µt)
is given by:
[G0φ0,φF ](t, i0, x) := ∂tF (t, i0, x) +
∑
j0 6=i0
[F (t, j0, x)− F (t, i0, x)]q0φ0(t, i0, j0, x)
+
M−1∑
i,j=1
∂xjF (t, i
0, x)xiqφ0,φ(t, i, j, i
0, x) + (1−
M−1∑
k=1
xk)
M−1∑
k=1
∂xjF (t, i
0, x)qφ0,φ(t,M, j, i
0, x).
Proof. Let us denote T N the semigroup associated with the time inhomogeneous Markov process
(t,X0,Nt , µ
N
t ) and the infinitesimal generator G0,Nφ0,φ. Recall that by the procedure of extension we described
above, the process (t,X0,Nt , µ
N
t ) now lives in E
∞ and the domain for G0,N
φ0,φ
is C(E∞). In light of Theorem
2.5, Chapter 4 in [8] and Proposition 1 we just proved, it boils down to proving that for any F ∈ E∞
and t ≥ 0, T Nt F converges to TtF , where (Tt)t≥0 is the strongly continuous semigroup generated by the
closure of G0φ0,φ.
To show the convergence, we apply Lemma 1. It is easy to see that C1(E∞) is a core for G¯0φ0,φ and
C1(E∞) is included in the domain of G0,N
φ0,φ
. Therefore it only remains to show that for all F ∈ C1(E∞),
G0,N
φ0,φ
F converges to G0φ0,φF in the space (C(E∞), ‖ · ‖). Using the notation xM := 1−
∑M−1
i=1 xi, we have:
|[G0,N
φ0,φ
F ](t, i0, x)− [G0φ0,φF ](t, i0, x)|
=
∑
j 6=i
|N(F (t, i0, x+ 1
N
eij)− F (t, i0, x))− (1j 6=M∂xjF (t, i0, x)− 1i 6=M∂xiF (t, i0, x))|xiqN (t, i, j, i0, x)
≤
∑
j 6=i
(|∂xjF (t, i0, x+
λi,j
N
ei,j)− ∂xjF (t, i0, x)|+ |∂xiF (t, i0, x+
λi,j
N
ei,j)− ∂xiF (t, i0, x)|)xiqN (t, i, j, i0, x)
(2)
where we applied intermediate value theorem at the last inequality and λi,j ∈ [0, 1]. Note that λi,j
also depends on t, x, i0 but we omit them for sake of the simplicity. Remark that F ∈ C1(E∞) and
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E∞ is compact, therefore ∂xiF is uniformly continuous on E
∞ for all i, which immediately implies that
‖G0,N
φ0,φ
F − G0φ0,φF‖ → 0, N → +∞. This completes the proof.
Mean Field Major Player’s Optimization Problem
Given that all the minor players are assumed to use a control strategy based on the same feedback
function φ, the best response of the major player is to use the strategy αˆ0 given by the feedback function
φˆ0 solving the optimal control problem:
inf
α
0↔φ0∈A0
E
[∫ T
0
f0(t,X0t , φ
0(t,X0t , µt), µt)dt+ g
0(X0T , µT )
]
where (X0t , µt)0≤t≤T is the continuous time Markov process with infinitesimal generator G0φ0,φ.
4.2 Representative Minor Player’s Problem
We turn to the computation of the best response of a generic minor player. We assume that the major
player chooses a strategy α0 ∈ A0 of the form α0t = φ0(t,X0,Nt , µNt ) and that the minor players in
{2, · · · , N} all use strategy αi ∈ A of the form αit = φ(t,Xi,Nt ,X0,Nt , µNt ) for i = 2, · · · , N , and that the
first minor player uses strategy øα ∈ A of the form øαt = øφ(t,X1,Nt ,X0,Nt , µNt ). Clearly, by symmetry,
whatever we are about to say after we singled the first minor player out, can be done if we single out any
other minor player. As before, for each fixed N , the process (X0,Nt ,X
1,N
t , µ
N
t ) is a finite-state continuous
time Markov process with state space {1, . . . ,M0}×{1, . . . ,M}×PN whose infinitesimal generator GNφ0,φ,øφ
is given, up to the time derivative, by the corresponding Q-matrix of infinitesimal jump rates. In the
present situation, its value on any real valued function F defined on [0, T ]×{1, . . . ,M0}×{1, . . . ,M}×PN
such that t→ F (t, i0, i, x) is C1 for any i0, i and x is given by the formula:
[GNφ0,φ,øφF ](t, i0, i, x) =∂tF (t, i0, i, x) +
∑
j0,j0 6=i0
[F (t, j0, i, x) − F (t, i0, i, x)]q0φ0(t, i0, j0, x)
+
∑
j,j 6=i
[F (t, i0, j, x +
1
N
eij)− F (t, i0, i, x)]qφ0,øφ(t, i, j, i0, x)
+
∑
(j,k),j 6=k
[F (t, i0, i, x+
1
N
ekj)− F (t, i0, i, x)](Nxk − 1k=i)qφ0,φ(t, k, j, i0, x).
(3)
As before the summations appearing above correspond to single jumps when 1) only the state of the
major player changes from state i0 to j0, 2) only the state of the singled out first minor player changes
from state i to j, and finally 3) the state of one of the last N − 1 minor players jumps from state k to j.
Following the same treatment as in major player’s problem, we have the convergence result for the
process (XNt ,X
0,N
t , µ
N
t ):
Theorem 2. Assume that for each integer N , the major player chooses a control α0 given by a Lipschitz
feedback function φ0, the first minor player chooses a control øα given by a Lipschitz feedback function
øφ, all the other minor players choose strategies given by the same Lipschitz feedback function φ, and that
these three feedback functions do not depend upon N . Let i0 ∈ {1, . . . ,M0} and for each integer N ≥ 2,
xN ∈ PN with limit x ∈ P. Then the sequence of processes (XNt ,X0,Nt , µNt )0≤t≤T with initial conditions
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XN0 = i, X
0,N
0 = i
0 and µN0 = x
N converges weakly to a Markov process (Xt,X
0
t , µt) with initial condition
X0 = i, X
0
0 = i
0 and µ0 = x. Its infinitesimal generator is given by:
[Gφ0,φ,øφF ](t, i, i0, x) := ∂tF (t, i, i0, x) +
∑
j0,j0 6=i0
[F (t, i, j0, x)− F (t, i, i0, x)]q0φ0(t, i0, j0, x)
+
∑
j,j 6=i
[F (t, j, i0, x)− F (t, i, i0, x)]qφ0,øφ(t, i, j, i0, x) +
M−1∑
i,j=1
∂xjF (t, i, i
0, x)xiqφ0,φ(t, i, j, i
0, x)
+ (1−
M−1∑
k=1
xk)
M−1∑
j=1
∂xkF (t, i, i
0, x)qφ0,φ(t,M, j, i
0, x).
Representative Minor Player’s Optimization Problem
Accordingly, in the mean field game limit, we define the search for the best response of the representative
minor player (i.e. the minor player we singled out) to the strategies adopted by the major player and the
field of minor players as the following optimal control problem. Assuming that the major player uses a
feedback function φ0 and all the other minor players the feedback function φ, the best response of the
representative minor player is given by the solution of:
inf
øα↔øφ∈A
E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xt, φ¯(t,Xt,X
0
t , µt),X
0
t , φ
0(t,X0t , µt), µt)dt+ g(XT ,X
0
T , µT )
]
where (Xt,X
0
t , µt)0≤t≤T is a Markov process with infinitesimal generator Gφ0,φ,øφ. We shall denote by
øφ = φ(φ0, φ) the optimal feedback function providing the solution of this optimal control problem.
5 Optimization Problem for Individual Players
In this section, we use the dynamic programming principle to characterize the value functions of the
major and minor players’ optimization problems as viscosity solutions of the corresponding Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB for short) equations. We follow the detailed arguments given in Chapter II of [9].
For both the major and representative minor player, we show that the value function solves a weakly
coupled system of Partial Differential Equations (PDEs for short) in viscosity sense. We also prove an
important uniqueness result for these solutions. This uniqueness result is important indeed because as
the reader noticed, in defining the best response map, we implicitly assumed that these optimization
problems could be solved and that their solutions were unique.
We first consider the value function of the major player’s optimization problem assuming that the
minor players use the feedback function φ:
V 0φ (t, i
0, x) := inf
α
0↔φ0
E
[∫ T
t
f0φ0(s,X
0
s , µs)ds + g
0(X0T , µT )|X0t = i0, µt = x
]
Theorem 3. Assume that for all i0 ∈ {1, . . . ,M0}, the mapping (t, x) → V 0φ (t, i0, x) is continuous on
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[0, T ]× P. Then V 0φ is a viscosity solution to the system of M0 PDEs on [0, T ]× P:
0 = ∂tv
0(t, i0, x) + inf
α0∈A0
{
f0(t, i0, α0, x) +
∑
j0 6=i0
[v0(t, j0, x)− v0(t, i0, x)]q0(t, i0, j0, α0, x)
+ (1 −
M−1∑
k=1
xk)
M−1∑
k=1
∂xkv
0(t, i0, x)q(t,M, k, φ(t,M, i0 , x), i0, α0, x)
+
M−1∑
i,j=1
∂xjv
0(t, i0, x)xiq(t, i, j, φ(t, i, i
0 , x), i0, α0, x)
}
, (i0, t, x) ∈ {1, . . . ,M0} × [0, T [×P,
v0(T, i0, x) = g0(i0, x), (i0, x) ∈ {1, . . . ,M0} × P.
(4)
The notion of viscosity solution in the above result is specified by the following definition:
Definition 1. A real valued function v0 defined on [0, T ] × {1, . . . ,M0} × P such that v0(·, i0, ·) is
continuous on [0, T ] × {1, . . . ,M0} × P for all i0 ∈ {1, . . . ,M0} is said to be a viscosity subsolution
(resp. supersolution) if for any (t, i0, x) ∈ [0, T ] × {1, . . . ,M0} × P and any C∞ function θ defined on
[0, T ] × P such that the function (v0(·, i0, ·) − θ) attains a maximum (resp. minimum) at (t, x) and
v0(t, i0, x) = θ(t, x), the following inequalities holds:
0 ≤ (resp. ≥) ∂tθ(t, x) + inf
α0∈A0
{
f0(t, i0, α0, x) +
∑
j0 6=i0
[v0(t, j0, x)− v0(t, i0, x)]q0(t, i0, j0, α0, x)
+ (1−
M−1∑
k=1
xk)
M−1∑
k=1
∂xkθ(t, x)q(t,M, k, φ(t,M, i
0, x), i0, α0, x)
+
M−1∑
i,j=1
∂xjθ(t, x)xiq(t, i, j, φ(t, i, i
0 , x), i0, α0, x)
}
, if t < T
0 ≤ (resp. ≥) g0(i0, x)− v0(t, i0, x), if t = T
If v0 is both a viscosity subsolution and supersolution, we call it a viscosity solution.
Proof. Define C(P)M0 the collection of functions θ(i0, x) defined on {1, . . . ,M0}×P such that θ(i0, ·)
is continuous on P for all i0. Define the dynamic programming operator Tt,s on C(P)M0 by:
[Tt,sθ](i0, x) := inf
α
0↔φ0
E
[∫ s
t
f0φ0(u,X
0
u, µu)du+ θ(X
0
s , µs)|X0t = i0, µt = x
]
(5)
where the Markov process (X0u, µu)0≤t≤T has infinitesimal generator G0φ0,φ. Then the value function can
be expressed as:
V 0φ (t, i
0, x) = [Tt,T g0](i0, x)
and the dynamic programming principle says that:
V 0φ (t, i
0, x) = [Tt,sV 0φ (s, ·, ·)](i0, x), (t, s, i0, x) ∈ [0, T ]2 × {1, . . . ,M0} × P.
We will use the following lemma whose proof we give in the appendix.
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Lemma 2. Let Φ be a function on [0, T ] × {1, . . . ,M0} × P and i0 ∈ {1, . . . ,M0} such that Φ(·, i0, ·) is
C1 in [0, T ]× P and Φ(·, j0, ·) is continuous in [0, T ]× P for all j0 6= i0. Then we have:
lim
h→0
1
h
[
(Tt,t+hΦ(t+ h, ·, ·))(i0 , x)− Φ(t, i0, x)
]
= ∂tΦ(t, i
0, x) + inf
α0∈A0
{
f0(t, i0, α0, x) + (1−
M−1∑
k=1
xk)
M−1∑
k=1
∂xkΦ(t, i
0, x)q(t,M, k, φ(t,M, i0 , x), i0, α0, x)
+
M−1∑
i,j=1
∂xjΦ(t, i
0, x)xiq(t, i, j, φ(t, i, i
0 , x), i0, α0, x) +
∑
j0 6=i0
[Φ(t, j0, x)− Φ(t, i0, x)]q0(t, i0, j0, α0, x)
}
.
We now prove the subsolution property. Let θ be a function defined on [0, T ]×P such that (V 0(·, i0, ·)−
θ) attains maximum at (t, x) and V 0(t, i0, x) = θ(t, x). Define the function Φ on [0, T ]×{1, . . . ,M0}×P
by Φ(·, i0, ·) := θ and Φ(·, j0, ·) := V 0(·, j0, ·) for j0 6= i0. Then clearly Φ ≥ V 0, which implies:
(Tt,sΦ(s, ·, ·))(i0, x) ≥ (Tt,sV 0(s, ·, ·))(i0, x)
By the dynamic programming principle and the fact that Φ(t, i0, x) = V 0(t, i0, x) we have:
lim
h→0
1
h
[
(Tt,sΦ(s, ·, ·))(i0, x)− Φ(t, i0, x)
] ≥ 0.
Then applying the lemma we obtain the desired inequality. The viscosity property for supersolution can
be checked in exactly the same way.
For later reference, we state the comparison principle for the HJB equation we just derived. Again, its
proof is postponed to the appendix.
Theorem 4. (Comparison Principle) Let us assume that the feedback function φ is Lipschitz, and let w
(resp. v) be a viscosity subsolution (resp. supersolution) of the equation (4). Then we have w ≤ v.
We now turn to the representative minor agent’s optimization problem assuming that the major player
uses the feedback function φ0 and all the other minor players use the feedback function φ. We define the
value function:
Vφ0,φ(t, i, i
0, x) := inf
øα↔øφ
E
[∫ T
t
fφ0,øφ(s,Xs,X
0
s , µs)ds + g(XT ,X
0
T , µT )|Xt = i,X0t = i0, µt = x
]
where the Markov process (Xt,X
0
t , µt)0≤t≤T has infinitesimal generator Gφ0,φ,øφ. In line with the analysis
of the major player’s problem, we can show that Vφ0,φ is the unique viscosity solution to a coupled system
of PDEs.
Theorem 5. Assume that for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and i0 ∈ {1, . . . ,M0}, the mapping (t, x)→ Vφ0,φ(t, i, i0, x)
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is continuous on [0, T ] × P. Then Vφ0,φ is a viscosity solution to the system of PDEs:
0 = ∂tv(t, i, i
0, x)
+ inf
øα∈A
{
f(t, i, øα, i0, φ0(t, i0, x), x) +
∑
j 6=i
[v(t, j, i0, x)− v(t, i, i0, x)]q(t, i, j, øα, i0 , φ0(t, i0, x), x)
}
+
∑
j0 6=i0
[v(t, i, j0, x)− v(t, i, i0, x)]q0φ0(t, i0, j0, x) + (1−
M−1∑
k=1
xk)
M−1∑
k=1
∂xkv(t, i, i
0, x)qφ0,φ(t,M, k, i
0, x)
+
M−1∑
i,j=1
∂xjv(t, i, i
0, x)xiqφ0,φ(t, i, j, i
0, x), (i, i0, t, x) ∈ {1, . . . ,M} × {1, . . . ,M0} × [0, T [×P
v(T, i, i0, x) = g(i, i0, x), (i, i0, x) ∈ {1, . . . ,M} × {1, . . . ,M0} × P.
(6)
Moreover, if the feedback functions φ0 and φ are Lipschitz, then the above system of PDEs satisfies the
comparison principle.
It turns out that the value functions V 0φ and Vφ0,φ are Lipschitz in (t, x). To establish this regularity
property and estimate the Lipschitz constants, we need to first study the regularity of the value functions
for the finite player games, and control the convergence in the regime of large games. We will state these
results in Section 8, where we deal with the propagation of chaos and highlight more connections between
finite player games and mean field games.
We conclude this section with a result which we will use frequently in the sequel. To state it, we
denote J0φ0,φ the expected cost of the major player when it uses the feedback function φ
0 and the minor
players all use the feedback function φ. Put differently:
J0φ0,φ(t, i
0, x) := E
[∫ T
t
f0φ0(s,X
0
s , µs)ds+ g
0(X0T , µT )|X0t = i0, µt = x
]
where the Markov process (X0s , µs)t≤s≤T has infinitesimal generator G0φ0,φ. Then by definition, we have
V 0φ (t, i
0, x) = inf
α
0↔φ0 J
0
φ0,φ(t, i
0, x). Similarly, we denote Jφ0,φ,øφ the expected cost of the representative
minor player when it uses the feedback function øφ, while the major player uses the feedback function
φ0 and all the other minor players use the same feedback function φ:
Jφ0,φ,øφ(t, i, i
0, x) := E
[∫ T
t
fφ0,øφ(s,Xs,X
0
s , µs)ds + g(XT ,X
0
T , µT )|Xt = i,X0t = i0, µt = x
]
where the Markov process (X0s ,X
s, µs)t≤s≤T has infinitesimal generator Gφ0,φ,øφ.
Proposition 2. If the feedback functions φ0, φ and øφ are Lipschitz, then J0φ0,φ and Jφ0,φ,øφ are respec-
tively continuous viscosity solutions of the PDEs (7) and (8){
0 = [G0φ0,φv0](t, i0, x) + f0φ0(t, i0, x)
0 = g0(i0, x)− v0(T, i0, x), (i0, x) ∈ {1, . . . ,M0} × P. (7){
0 = [Gφ0,φ,øφv](t, i, i0, x) + fφ0,øφ(t, i, i0, x)
0 = g(i, i0, x)− v(T, i, i0, x), (i, i0, x) ∈ {1, . . . ,M} × {1, . . . ,M0} × P.
(8)
Moreover, the PDEs (7) and (8) satisfy the comparison principle.
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Proof. The continuity of J0φ0,φ and Jφ0,φ,øφ follows from the fact that (X
0
t , µt) and (Xt,X
0
t , µt) are
Feller processes, which we have shown in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. The viscosity property can be
shown using the exact same technique as in the proof of Theorem 3. Finally the comparison principle is
a consequence of the Lipschitz property of f0, f, q0, q, φ0, φ, øφ and can be shown by slightly modifying
the proof of Theorem 4. We leave the details of the proof to the reader.
6 Existence of Nash Equilibria
In this section, we prove existence of Nash equilibria when the minor player’s jump rates and cost functions
do not depend upon the major player’s control. We work under the following assumption:
Hypothesis 6. Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 are in force. In addition, the transition rate function q
and the cost function f for the minor player do not depend upon the major player’s control α0 ∈ A0.
The following assumptions will guarantee the existence of optimal strategies for both the major player
and representative minor player.
Hypothesis 7. For all i0 = 1, . . . ,M0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×P and v0 ∈ RM0, the function α0 → f0(t, i0, α0, x)+∑
j0 6=i0(v
0
j0 − v0i0)q0(t, i0, j0, α0, x) has a unique maximizer in A0 denoted as αˆ0(t, i0, x, v0). Additionally,
αˆ0 is Lipschitz in (t, x, v0) for all i0 = 1, . . . ,M0 with common Lipschitz constant Lα0 .
Hypothesis 8. For all i = 1, . . . ,M , i0 = 1, . . . ,M0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×P and v ∈ RM×M0, the function α→
f(t, α, i, i0, x) +
∑
j 6=i(vj,i0 − vi,i0)q(t, i, j, α, i0 , x) has a unique maximizer in A denoted as αˆ(t, i, i0, x, v).
Additionally, αˆ is Lipschitz in (t, x, v) for all i0 = 1, . . . ,M0 and i = 1, . . . ,M with common Lipschitz
constant Lα.
Proposition 3. Under Hypothesis 6 - 8, we have:
(i) For any Lipschitz feedback function φ for the representative minor player, the best response φ0∗(φ)
of the major player exists and is given by:
φ0∗(φ)(t, i0, x) = αˆ0(t, i0, x, V 0φ (t, ·, x)) (9)
where αˆ0 is the minimizer defined in Hypothesis 7 and V 0φ is the value function of the major player’s
optimization problem.
(ii) For any Lipschitz feedback function φ0 for the major player and φ for the other minor players,
the best response φ∗(φ0, φ) of the representative minor player exists and is given by:
φ∗(φ0, φ)(t, i, i0, x) = αˆ(t, i, i0, x, Vφ0,φ(t, ·, ·, x)) (10)
where αˆ is the minimizer defined in Hypothesis 8 and Vφ0,φ is the value function of representative minor
player’s optimization problem.
Proof. Consider the expected total cost J0φ0∗(φ),φ of the major player when all the minor players
use the feedback function φ and the major player uses the strategy given by the feedback function
φ0∗(φ) defined by (9). Also consider V 0φ the value function of the major player’s optimization problem.
By definition of φ0∗(φ) and the PDE (4), we see that V 0φ is a viscosity solution of the PDE (7) with
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φ0 = φ0∗(φ) and φ = φ in Proposition 2. To be able to use the comparison principle, we need to
show that φ0 = φ0∗(φ) and φ are Lipschitz. Indeed the Lipschitz property follows from Hypothesis 7
and Corollary 1 (see Section 8). Now since J0φ0∗(φ),φ is another viscosity solution for the same PDE, we
conclude that J0φ0∗(φ),φ = V
0
φ = infα0↔φ0 J
0
φ0,φ and hence the optimality of φ
0∗(φ). Likewise we can show
that φ∗(φ0, φ) is the best response of the representative minor player.
In order to show that the Nash Equilibrium is actually given by a couple of Lipschitz feedback functions,
we need an additional assumption on the regularity of value functions.
Hypothesis 9. There exists two constants Lφ0 , Lφ, such that for all Lφ0-Lipschitz feedback function φ
0
and Lφ-Lipschitz feedback function φ, V
0
φ is (Lφ0/Lα0 − 1)-Lipschitz and Vφ0,φ is (Lφ/Lα − 1)-Lipschitz.
The above assumption holds, for example, when the horizon of the game is sufficiently small. We shall
provide more details (see Remark 2 below) after we reveal important connections between finite player
games and mean field games in Section 8. We now state and prove existence of Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 6. Under Hypothesis 6 - 9, there exists a Nash equilibrium in the sense that there exists
Lipschitz feedback functions φˆ0 and φˆ such that:
[φˆ0, φˆ] = [φ0∗(φˆ),φ∗(φˆ0, φˆ)].
Proof. We apply Schauder’s fixed point theorem. To this end, we need to: (i) specify a Banach space V
containing the admissible feedback functions (φ0, φ) as elements, and a relatively compact convex subset
K of V; (ii) show that the mapping R : [φ0, φ]→ [φ0∗(φ),φ∗(φ0, φ)] is continuous and leaves K invariant
(i.e. R(K) ⊂ K).
(i) Define C0 as the collection of A0 - valued functions φ
0 on [0, T ] × {1, . . . ,M0} × P such that (t, x)×
φ0(t, i0, x) is continuous for all i0, C as the collection of A - valued functions φ on [0, T ] × {1, . . . ,M} ×
{1, . . . ,M0} × P such that (t, x) × φ(t, i, i0, x) is continuous for all i, i0, and set V := C0 × C. For all
(φ0, φ) ∈ V, we define the norm:
‖(φ0, φ)‖ := max
{
sup
i0,t∈[0,T ],x∈P
|φ0(t, i0, x)|, sup
i,i0,t∈[0,T ],x∈P
|φ(t, i, i0, x)|
}
.
It is easy to check that (V, ‖ · ‖) is a Banach space. Next, we define K as the collection of elements in V
such that the mappings (t, x) → φ0(t, i0, x) are L0−Lipschitz and (t, x) → φ(t, i, i0, x) are L−Lipschitz
in (t, x) for all i0 = 1, . . . ,M0 and i = 1, . . . ,M , where L0, L are specified in Hypothesis 9. Clearly K
is convex. Now consider the family (φ0(·, i0, ·))(φ0,φ)∈K of functions defined on [0, T ] × P. Thanks to
the Lipschitz property, we see immediately that the family is equicontinuous and pointwise bounded.
Therefore by Arzela`-Ascoli theorem, the family is compact with respect to the uniform norm. Repeating
this argument for all i, i0 we see that K is compact under the norm ‖ · ‖. Moreover, thanks to Hypothesis
7 - 9, we obtain easily that K is stable by R.
(ii) It remains to show that R is a continuous mapping. We use the following lemma:
Lemma 3. Let (φ0n, φn) be a sequence in K converging to (φ
0, φ) in ‖ · ‖, and denote by V 0n and Vn the
value functions of the major and representative minor players associated with (φ0n, φn). Then V
0
n and Vn
converge uniformly to V 0 and V respectively where V 0 and V are the value functions of the major player
and the representative minor player associated with (φ0, φ).
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The proof of the lemma uses standard arguments from the theory of viscosity solutions. We give it in
the Appendix. Now the continuity of the mapping R follows readily from Lemma 3, Proposition 3 and
Hypothesis 7 & 8. This completes the proof.
7 The Master Equation and the Verification Argument for Nash Equi-
libria
If a Nash equilibrium exists and is given by feedback functions φˆ0 for the major player and φˆ for the
minor players, these functions should also be equal to the respective minimizers of the Hamiltonians in
the HJB equations of the optimization problems. This informal remark leads to a system of coupled
PDEs with terminal conditions specified at t = T , which we expect to hold if the equilibrium exists. Now
the natural question to ask is: if this system of PDEs has a solution, does this solution provide a Nash
equilibrium? The following result provides a verification argument:
Theorem 7. (Verification Argument) Assume that there exists two function φˆ0 : [0, T ]×{1, . . . ,M0}×P ∋
(t, i0, x)→ φˆ0(t, i0, x) ∈ R and φˆ : [0, T ] × {1, . . . ,M} × {1, . . . ,M0} × P ∋ (t, i, i0, x)→ φˆ(t, i, i0, x) ∈ R
such that the system of PDEs in (v0, v):
0 = [G0
φˆ0,φˆ
v0](t, i0, x) + f0(t, i0, φˆ0(t, i0, x), x)
v0(T, i0, x) = g0(i0, x), (i0, x) ∈ {1, . . . ,M0} × P
0 = [Gφˆ0,φˆ,φˆv](t, i, i0, x) + f(t, i, φˆ(t, i, i0, x), i0, φˆ0(t, i0, x), x)
v(T, i, i0, x) = g(i, i0, x), (i, i0, x) ∈ {1, . . . ,M} × {1, . . . ,M0} × P
(11)
admits a classical solution (Vˆ 0, Vˆ ) (i.e. the solution are C1 in t and x). Assume in addition that:
φˆ0(t, i0, x) = αˆ0(t, i0, x, Vˆ 0(t, ·, x))
φˆ(t, i, i0, x) = αˆ(t, i, i0, x, Vˆ (t, ·, ·, x))
(12)
Then φˆ0 and φˆ form a Nash equilibrium and Vˆ 0(0,X00 , µ0) and Vˆ (0,X0,X
0
0 , µ0) are the equilibrium
expected costs of the major and minor players.
Proof. We show that φˆ0 = φ0∗(φˆ) and φˆ = φ∗(φˆ0, φˆ). Notice first that φˆ0 and φˆ are Lipschitz strategies
due to the regularity of Vˆ 0, Vˆ and Hypothesis 7-8.
Consider the major player optimization problem where we let φ = φˆ and denote by V 0
φˆ
the corre-
sponding value function. Then since Vˆ 0 is a classical solution to (11) and because of (12), we deduce that
Vˆ 0 is a viscosity solution to the HJB equation (4) associated with the value function V 0
φˆ
. By uniqueness
of the viscosity solution, we conclude that Vˆ 0 = V 0
φˆ
.
On the other hand, if we denote by J0
φˆ0,φˆ
the expected cost function of the major player when it uses
the feedback function φˆ0 and all the minor players use strategy φˆ, then the fact that Vˆ 0 is a classical
solution to (11) implies that Vˆ 0 is also a viscosity solution. Then by Proposition 2 we have J0
φˆ0,φˆ
= Vˆ 0
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and therefore J0
φˆ0,φˆ
= V 0
φˆ
= inf
α
0↔φ0 J
0
φ0,φˆ
. This means that φˆ0 is the best response of the major player
to the minor players using feedback function φˆ.
For the optimization problem of the representative minor player, we use the same argument based on
the uniqueness of solution of PDE to obtain Jφˆ0,φˆ,φˆ = Vˆ = Vφˆ0,φˆ = infα¯↔φ¯ Jφˆ0,φˆ,φ¯. This implies that φˆ is
the representative player’s best response to the major player using feedback function φˆ0 and the rest of
the minor players using φˆ. We conclude that φˆ0 and φˆ form the desired fixed point for the best response
map.
It is important to keep in mind that the above verification argument of the Master equation does not
speak to the problem of existence of Nash equilibria. However, it provides a convenient way to compute
numerically the equilibrium via the solution of a coupled system of first-order PDEs.
8 Propagation of Chaos and Approximate Nash Equilibria
In this section we show that in the (N + 1)-player game (see description in Section 2), when the major
player and each minor player apply the respective equilibrium strategy in the mean field game, the system
is in an approximate Nash equilibrium. To uncover this link, we first revisit the (N +1)-player game. We
show that for a certain strategy profile, the expected cost of individual player in the finite player game
converges to that of the mean field game. Our argument is largely similar to the one used in proving the
convergence of numerical scheme for viscosity solutions. One crucial intermediate result we use here is
the gradient estimate for the value functions of the (N + 1)-player game. Similar results were proved in
[10] for discrete state mean field game without major player. As a biproduct of the proof, we can also
conclude that the value function of the mean field game is Lipschitz in the measure argument. In the
rest of the section, we assume that Hypothesis 6 is in force.
8.1 Back to the (N + 1)-Player Game
In this section, we focus on the game with a major player and N minor players. We show that both
the expected costs of individual players and the value functions of the players’ optimization problems
can be characterized by coupled systems of ODEs, and their gradients are bounded by some constant
independent of N . Such a gradient estimate will be crucial in establishing results on propagation of chaos,
as well as the regularity of the value functions for the limiting mean field game.
We start from the major player’s optimization problem. Consider a strategy profile where the major
player chooses a Lipschitz feedback function φ0 and all the N minor players choose the same Lipschitz
feedback function φ. Recall that the process comprising the major player’s state and the empirical
distirbution of the states of the minor players, say (X0,Nt , µ
N
t ), is a finite-state Markov process in the
space {1, . . . ,M0}×PN , where PN := { 1N (k1, . . . , kM−1)|
∑
i ki ≤ N, ki ∈ N}. Its infinitesimal generator
G0,N
φ0,φ
was given by (1). The expected cost to the major player is given by:
J0,N
φ0,φ
(t, i0, x) := E
[∫ T
t
f0φ0(s,X
0,N
s , µ
N
s )ds + g
0(X0,NT , µ
N
T )| X0,Nt = i0, µNt = x
]
and the value function of the major player’s optimization problem by:
V 0,Nφ (t, i
0, x) := inf
α
0↔φ0∈A0
J0,N
φ0,φ
(t, i0, x).
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Despite the notation, J0,N
φ0,φ
can be viewed as a function defined on [0, T ] with values given by vectors
indexed by (i0, x). The following result shows that J0,N
φ0,φ
is characterized by a coupled system of ODEs.
Proposition 4. Let φ0 ∈ L0 and φ ∈ L, then J0,N
φ0,φ
is the unique classical solution of the system of ODEs:
0 = θ˙(t, i0, x) + f0φ0(t, i
0, x) +
∑
j0,j0 6=i0
(θ(t, j0, x)− θ(t, i0, x))q0φ0(t, i0, j0, x)
+
∑
(i,j),j 6=i
(θ(t, i0, x+
1
N
eij)− θ(t, i0, x))Nxiqφ0,φ(t, i, j, i0, x)
0 = θ(t, i0, x)− g0(i0, x)
(13)
Proof. The existence and uniqueness of the solution to (13) is an easy consequence of the Lipschitz
property of the functions f0, q, q0, φ0, φ and Cauchy-Lipschitz Theorem. The fact that J0,N
φ0,φ
is a solution
to (13) follows from Dynkin formula.
We state without proof the similar result for V 0,Nβ .
Proposition 5. If Hypotheses 6 - 8 hold and φ is a Lipschitz strategy, then V 0,Nφ is the unique classical
solution of the system of ODEs:
0 = θ˙(t, i0, x) + inf
α0∈A0
{f0(t, i0, α0, x) +
∑
j0,j0 6=i0
(θ(t, j0, x)− θ(t, i0, x))q0(t, i0, j0, α0, x)}
+
∑
(i,j),j 6=i
(θ(t, i0, x+
1
N
eij)− θ(t, i0, x))Nxiq(t, i, j, φ(t, i, i0 , x), i0, x)
0 = θ(t, i0, x)− g0(i0, x)
(14)
The following estimates for J0,N
φ0,φ
and V 0,Nφ will play a crucial role in proving convergence to the
solution of the mean field game. Their proofs are postponed to the appendix.
Proposition 6. For all Lipschitz strategies φ0, φ, there exists a constant L only depending on T and
the Lipschitz constants and bounds of φ0, φ, q0, q, f0, g0 such that for all N > 0, (t, i0, x) ∈ [0, T ] ×
{1, . . . ,M0} × PN and j, k ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, j 6= k, we have:
|J0,N
φ0,φ
(t, i0, x)| ≤ ‖g0‖∞ + T‖f0‖∞, and J0,Nφ0,φ(t, i0, x+
1
N
ejk)− J0,Nφ0,φ(t, i0, x)| ≤
L
N
.
Proposition 7. For each Lipschitz feedback function φ with Lipschitz constant Lφ, there exists constants
C0, C1, C2, C3, C4 > 0 only depending on M
0, M , the Lipschitz constants and bounds of q0, q, f0, g0, such
that for all N > 0, (t, i0, x) ∈ [0, T ] × {1, . . . ,M0} × PN and j, k ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, j 6= k, we have:
|V 0,Nφ (t, i0, x+
1
N
ejk)− V 0,Nφ (t, i0, x)| ≤
C0 + C1T + C2T
2
N
exp[(C3 + C4Lφ)T ].
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We now turn to the problem of the representative minor player. We consider a strategy profile where
the major player uses a feedback function φ0, the first (N − 1) minor players use a feedback function φ
and the remaining (de facto the representative) minor player uses the feedback function øφ. We recall
that (XNt ,X
0,N
t , µ
N
t ) is a Markov process with infinitesimal generator GNφ0,φ,øφ defined as in (3). We are
interested in the representative minor player’s expected cost:
JNφ0,φ,øφ(t, i, i
0, x) := E
[ ∫ T
t
fφ0,øφ(s,X
N
s ,X
0,N
s , µ
N
s )ds+ g(X
N
T ,X
0,N
T , µ
N
T )| XNt = i,X0,Nt = i0, µNt = x
]
as well as the value function of the representative minor player’s optimization problem:
V Nφ0,φ(t, i, i
0, x) := sup
α↔øφ∈A
JNφ0,φ,øφ(t, i, i
0, x).
In full analogy with propositions 6 and 7, we state the following results without proof.
Proposition 8. For all Lipschitz feedback functions φ0 and φ, there exists a constant L only depending
on T and the Lipschitz constants and bounds of φ0, φ, øφ, q0, q, f, g such that for all N > 0, (t, i0, x) ∈
[0, T ]× {1, . . . ,M0} × PN and j, k ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, j 6= k, we have:
|JNφ0,φ,øφ(t, i, i0, x)| ≤ ‖g‖∞ + T‖f‖∞, and JNφ0,φ,øφ(t, i, i0, x+
1
N
ejk)− JNφ0,φ,øφ(t, i, i0, x)| ≤
L
N
.
Proposition 9. There exist constants D0,D1,D2,D3,D4,D5 > 0 depending only on M
0, M , the Lip-
schitz constants and bounds of q0, q, f, g such that for all Lipschitz feedback functions φ0 and φ with
Lipschitz constants Lφ0 and Lφ respectively, and for all N > 0, (t, i
0, x) ∈ [0, T ]×{1, . . . ,M0}×PN and
j, k ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, j 6= k, we have:
|V 0,N
φ0,φ
(t, i, i0, x+
1
N
ejk)− V 0,Nφ0,φ(t, i, i0, x)| ≤
D0 +D1T +D2T
2 +D3Lφ0T
N
exp[(D4 +D5Lφ))T ].
8.2 Propagation of Chaos
We now prove two important limiting results. They are related to the propagation of chaos in the sense
that they identify the limiting behavior of an individual when interacting with the mean field. First,
we prove uniform convergence of the value functions of the individual players’ optimization problems.
Combined with the gradient estimates proven in the previous subsection, this establishes the Lipschitz
property of the value functions in the mean field limit. Second, we prove that the expected costs of the
individual players in the (N + 1) - player game converge to their mean field limits at the rate N−1/2.
This will help us show that the Nash equilibrium of the mean field game provides approximative Nash
equilibria for the finite player games.
Theorem 8. For all Lipschitz strategy φ0, φ, we have:
sup
t,i0,x
|V 0φ (t, i0, x)− V 0,Nφ (t, i0, x)| → 0, N → +∞ (15)
sup
t,i,i0,x
|Vφ0,φ(t, i, i0, x)− V Nφ0,φ(t, i, i0, x)| → 0, N → +∞ (16)
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Proof. We only provide a proof for (15) as (16) can be shown in the exact the same way.
(i) Fix a Lipschitz strategy φ for the minor players. To simplify the notation, we set vN := V
0,N
φ . Notice
that (t, i0, x)→ vN (t, i0, x) is only defined on [0, T ]×{1, . . . ,M0}×PN , so our first step is to extend the
domain of vN (t, i0, x) to [0, T ]×{1, . . . ,M0}×P. This can be done by considering the linear interpolation
of vN . More specifically, for any x ∈ P, we denote xk, k = 1, . . . , 2M−1 the 2M−1 closest neighbors of x
in the set PN . There exists αk, k = 1, . . . , 2M−1 positive constants such that x =
∑2M−1
k=1 αkxk. We then
define the extension, still denoted as vN , to be v
N (t, i0, x) :=
∑2N−1
k=1 αkvN (t, i
0, xk). It is straightforward
to verify that vN is continuous in (t, x), Lipschitz in x uniformly in (t, i
0), and C1 in t. Using the
boundedness and Lipschitz property of vN , f
0, q0, q, φ, we obtain a straight forward estimation:
L
N
≥ ∣∣v˙N (t, i0, x) + inf
α0∈A0
{f0(t, i0, α0, x) +
∑
j0,j0 6=i0
(vN (t, j
0, x)− vN (t, i0, x))q0(t, i0, j0, α0, x)}
+
∑
(i,j),j 6=i
(vN (t, i
0, x+
1
N
eij)− vN (t, i0, x))Nxiq(t, i, j, φ(t, i, i0 , x), i0, x)
∣∣ (17)
L
N
≥ |vN (t, i0, x)− g0(i0, x)| (18)
where the constant L only depends on the bounds and Lipschitz constants of f0, q0, q and φ.
(ii) Now let us denote v¯(t, i0, x) := lim sup∗ vN (t, i
0, x) and
¯
vN (t, i
0, x) := lim inf∗ vN (t, i
0, x), see Section
9.3 for definitions of the operators lim sup∗ and lim inf∗. We show that v¯ and
¯
v are viscosity subsolution
and viscosity supersolution of the HJB equation (4) of the major player respectively. Recall that we
assume now that q does not depend on α. Then since V 0φ is also a viscosity solution to (4), the comparison
principle allows us to conclude that v¯(t, i0, x) =
¯
v(t, i0, x) = V 0φ and the uniform convergence follows by
standard arguments.
(iii) It remains to show that v¯ is a viscosity subsolution to the PDE (4). The proof of
¯
v being a viscosity
supersolution can be done in exactly the same way. Let θ be a smooth function and (t¯, i0, x¯) ∈ [0, T ] ×
{1, . . . ,M0} × P be such that (t, x)→ v¯(t, i0, x)− θ(t, x) has maximum at (t¯, x¯) and v¯(t¯, i0, x¯) = θ(t¯, x¯).
Then by Lemma 6.1. in [16], there exists sequences Nn → +∞, tn → t¯, xn → x¯ such that for each
n, the mapping (t, x) → vNn(t, i0, x) − θ(t, x) attains a maximum at tn, xn and δn := vNn(tn, i0, xn) −
θ(tn, xn) → 0. Instead of extracting a subsequence, we may assume that vNn(tn, ·, xn) → (r1, . . . , rM0),
where rj0 ≤ v¯(t¯, j0, x¯) and ri0 = v¯(t¯, i0, x¯).
Assume that t¯ = T , then v¯(t¯, i0, x¯) ≤ g0(i0, x¯) follows easily from (18). Now assume that t¯ < T .
Instead of extracting a subsequence, we may assume that tn < T for all n. Then by maximality we have
∂tθ(tn, xn) = ∂tvNn(tn, xn). Again by maximality, we have for all i, j = 1, . . . ,M, i 6= j:
vNn(tn, i
0, xn +
1
Nn
ei,j)− vNn(tn, i0, xn) ≤ θ(tn, i0, xn +
1
Nn
ei,j)− θ(tn, i0, xn).
Injecting the above inequalities into the estimation (17) and using the postivity of q, we obtain:
− L
Nn
≤ ∂tθ(tn, i0, xn) + inf
α0∈A0
{
f0(tn, i
0, α0, xn) +
∑
j0,j0 6=i0
(vNn(tn, j
0, xn)− vNn(tn, i0, xn))q0(tn, i0, j0, α0, xn)
}
+
∑
(i,j),j 6=i
(θ(tn, i
0, xn +
1
Nn
eij)− θ(tn, i0, xn))Nn(xn)iq(tn, i, j, φ(tn, i, i0, xn), i0, xn).
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Taking limit in n we obtain:
0 ≤ ∂tθ(t¯, i0, x¯) + inf
α0∈A0
{f0(t¯, i0, α0, x¯) +
∑
j0,j0 6=i0
(rj0 − ri0)q0(t¯, i0, j0, α0, x¯)}
+
∑
(i,j),j 6=i
(1j 6=M∂xjθ(t¯, i
0, x¯)− 1i 6=M∂xiθ(t¯, i0, x¯))x¯iq(t¯, i, j, φ(t¯, i, i0 , x¯), i0, x¯)
Now since q0 is positive and rj0 ≤ v¯(t¯, j0, x¯) for all j0 6= i0 and ri0 = v¯(t¯, i0, x¯) we have:
inf
α0∈A0
{f0(t¯, i0, α0, x¯) +
∑
j0,j0 6=i0
(rj0 − ri0)q0(t¯, i0, j0, α0, x¯)}
≤ inf
α0∈A0
{f0(t¯, i0, α0, x¯) +
∑
j0,j0 6=i0
(øv(t¯, j0, x¯)− øv(t¯, i0, x¯))q0(t¯, i0, j0, α0, x¯)}.
The desired inequality for viscosity subsolution follows immediately. This completes the proof.
As an immediate consequence of the uniform convergence and the gradient estimates for the value func-
tions V 0,Nφ and V
N
φ0,φ, we have:
Corollary 1. Under hypotheses 6-8, for all Lipschitz feedback functions φ0 and φ with Lipschitz constants
Lφ0 and Lφ respectively, the value functions V
0
φ and V
0
φ0,φ are Lipschitz in (t, x). More specifically, there
exist strictly positive constants B, Ci, i = 0, . . . , 4, Di, i = 0, . . . , 5 that only depend on the bounds and
Lipschitz constants of f, f0, g0, g, q, q0 such that
|V 0φ (t, i0, x)− V 0φ (s, i0, y)| ≤B|t− s|+ (C0 + C1T + C2T 2) exp((C3 + C4Lφ)T )‖x− y‖ (19)
|Vφ0,φ(t, i, i0, x)− Vφ0,φ(s, i, i0, y)| ≤B|t− s|+ (D0 +D1T +D2T 2 +D3Lφ0T ) exp((D4 +D5Lφ)T )‖x− y‖.
(20)
Proof. The Lipschitz property in x is an immediate consequence of Theorem 8, Proposition 7 and
Proposition 9. To prove the Lipschitz property on t, we remark that for each N , V 0,Nφ and V
N
φ0,φ are
Lipschitz in t, uniformly in N . Indeed V 0,Nφ is a classical solution of the system (14) of ODEs. Then it is
clear that ddtV
0,N
φ is bounded by the bounds of f
0, g0, q0, q. We deduce that V 0,Nφ is Lipschitz in t with a
Lipschitz constant that only depends on M,M0 and the bounds of f0, g0, q0, q. By convergence of V 0,Nφ ,
we conclude that V 0φ is also Lipschitz in t and shares the Lipschitz constant of V
0,N
φ . The same argument
applies to Vφ0,φ.
Remark 2. From Corollary 1, we see that Hypothesis 9 holds when T is sufficiently small. Indeed we
can first choose Lφ0 > La(1+max{B,C0}) and Lφ > Lb(1+max{B,D0}) and then choose T sufficiently
small, so that the Lipschitz constant of V 0φ is smaller than (Lφ0/La − 1) and the Lipschitz constant of
Vφ0,φ is smaller than (Lφ/Lb − 1).
We now state our second result on the propagation of chaos: the expected cost of an individual player
in the (N + 1)-player game converges to the expected cost in the mean field game at a rate of N−1/2.
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Theorem 9. There exists a constant L depending only on T and the Lipschitz constants of φ0, φ, øφ,
f , f0, g, g0, q and q0 such that for all N > 0, t ≤ T , x ∈ PN , i = 1, . . . ,M and i0 = 1, . . . ,M0, we have
|J0,N
φ0,φ
(t, i0, x)− J0φ0,φ(t, i0, x)| ≤L/
√
N
|JNφ0,φ,øφ(t, i, i0, x)− Jφ0,φ,øφ(t, i, i0, x)| ≤L/
√
N.
Our proof is based on standard techniques from the convergence rate analysis of numerical schemes
for viscosity solutions of PDEs, c.f. [3] and [1] for example. The key step of the proof is the construction
of a smooth subsolution and a smooth supersolution of the PDEs (7) and (8) that characterizing J0φ0,φ
and J0φ0,φ,øφ respectively. See Proposition 2. We construct these solutions by mollifying an extended
version of J0,N
φ0,φ
. Then we derive the bound by using the comparison principle. In the following we detail
the proof for the convergence rate of the major player’s expected cost. The case of the generic minor
player can be dealt with in exactly the same way.
Since J0,N
φ0,φ
(t, i, x) is only defined for x ∈ PN , in order to mollify J0,N
φ0,φ
, we need to first construct an
extension of J0,N
φ0,φ
defined for all x ∈ O for an open set O containing P. To this end, we consider the
following system of ODE:
0 = θ˙(t, i0, x) + f˜0(t, i0, φ˜0(t, i0, x), x) +
∑
j0,j0 6=i0
(θ(t, j0, x)− θ(t, i0, x))q˜0(t, i0, j0, φ˜0(t, i0, x), x)
+
∑
(i,j),j 6=i
(θ(t, i0, x+
1
N
eij)− θ(t, i0, x))N max{xi, 0}q˜(t, i, j, φ˜(t, i, i0 , x), i0, φ˜0(t, i0, x), x)
0 = θ(T, i0, x)− g˜0(i0, x)
Here φ˜0, φ˜, f˜0, g˜0 and q˜0 are respectively extensions of φ0, φ, f0, g0 and q0 from x ∈ P to x ∈ RN−1,
which are Lipschitz in x. The following is proved using the same arguments as for Proposition 4.
Lemma 4. The system (13) of ODEs admits a unique solution vN defined in [0, T ]×{1, . . . ,M0}×RM−1.
Moreover we have:
(i) vN (t, i0, x) is Lipschitz in x uniformly in t and i0 and the Lipschitz constant only depends on T and
the Lipschitz constants of φ0, φ,f0, g0, q0.
(ii) vN (t, i0, x) = J0,N
φ0,φ
(t, i0, x) for all x ∈ PN .
To construct smooth super and sub solutions, we use a family of mollifiers ρǫ defined by ρǫ(x) :=
ρ(x/ǫ)/ǫN−1, where ρ is a smooth and positive function with compact support in the unit ball of RM−1 and
satisfying
∫
RM−1 ρ(x)dx = 1. For ǫ > 0, we define v
N
ǫ as the mollification of v
N on [0, T ]×{1, . . . ,M0}×P:
vNǫ (t, i
0, x) :=
∫
y∈RM−1
vN (t, i0, x− y)ρǫ(y)dy.
Using the Lipschitz property of φ0, φ, f0, g0, q0 and straightforward estimates on the mollifier ρǫ, we
obtain the following properties on vNǫ .
Lemma 5. vNǫ is C
∞ in x and C1 in t. Moreover, there exists a constant C that depends only on T and
the Lipschitz constants of φ0, φ, f0, g0 and q0 such that for all i0 = 1, . . . ,M0, i = 1, . . . ,M , t ≤ T and
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x, y ∈ P, the following estimations hold:
Lǫ ≥ |[G0,N
φ0,φ
vNǫ ](t, i
0, x) + f0(t, i0, φ0(t, i0, x), x)| (21)
Lǫ ≥ |vNǫ (T, i0, x)− g0(i0, x)| (22)
L
ǫ
‖x− y‖ ≥ |∂xivNǫ (t, i0, x)− ∂xivNǫ (t, i0, y)|. (23)
We are now ready to prove Theorem 9. We construct viscosity super and sub solutions by adjusting
vNǫ with a linear function on t. Then the comparison principle allows us to conclude.
Proof. (of Theorem 9) We denote by L a generic constant that only depends on T and the Lipschitz
constants of φ0, φ,f0, g0 and q0. Using (21), (22) and (23) in Lemma 5, we obtain:
L(ǫ+
1
Nǫ
) ≥ |[G0φ0,φvNǫ ](t, i0, x) + f0(t, i0, φ0(t, i0, x), x)|
Lǫ ≥ |vNǫ (T, i0, x)− g0(i0, x)|.
Next we define:
vN± (t, i
0, x) := vNǫ (t, i
0, x)± [L(ǫ+ 1
Nǫ
)(T − t) + Lǫ].
Since vN− and v
N
+ are smooth, the above estimation immediately implies that v
N
− and v
N
+ are viscosity
sub and super solutions of the PDE (7) respectively. By Proposition 2, J0φ0,φ is a continuous viscosity
solution to the PDE (7). Then by the comparison principle we have vN− ≤ J0φ0,φ ≤ vN+ , which implies:
|vNǫ (t, i0, x)− J0φ0,φ(t, i0, x)| ≤ L(ǫ+
1
Nǫ
)(T − t) + Lǫ
Now using the property of the mollifier and Lemma 4, we have for all t ≤ T , i0 = 1, . . . ,M0 and x ∈ PN :
|vNǫ (t, i0, x)− J0,Nφ0,φ(t, i0, x)| = |vNǫ (t, i0, x)− vN (t, i0, x)| ≤ Lǫ.
The desired results follow by combining the above inequalities and choosing ǫ = 1/
√
N .
8.3 Approximative Nash Equilibria
The following is an immediate consequence of the above propagation of chaos results.
Theorem 10. Assume that the Mean Field Game attains Nash equilibrium when the major player chooses
a Lipschitz strategy αˆ and all the minor players choose a Lipschitz strategy βˆ. Denote L0 the Lipschitz
constant for αˆ and βˆ. Then for any L ≥ L0, (αˆ, βˆ) is an approximative Nash equilibrium within all the
L−Lipschitz strategies. More specifically, there exist constants C > 0 and N0 ∈ N depending on L0 such
that for all N ≥ N0, all strategy α for major player and β for minor player that are L-Lipschitz, we have
J0,N (αˆ, βˆ, . . . , βˆ) ≥ J0,N (α, βˆ, . . . , βˆ)− C/
√
N
JN (αˆ, βˆ, . . . , βˆ) ≥ JN (αˆ, βˆ, . . . , β, . . . βˆ)− C/
√
N
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9 Appendix
9.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Recall the dynamic programming operator defined in (5). Let Φ be a mapping on [0, T ]×{1, . . . ,M0}×P
such that Φ(·, i0, ·) is C1 in [0, T ] × P and Φ(·, j0, ·) is continuous in [0, T ] × P for j0 6= i0. We are going
to evaluate the following limit:
lim
h→0
1
h
{
[Tt,t+hΦ(t+ h, ·, ·)](i0 , x)− Φ(t, i0, x)
}
:= lim
h→0
Ih
(i) Let us first assume that Φ(·, j0, ·) is C1 in [0, T ] × P for all j0. Consider a constant control α0, then
by definition of the operator we have:
Ih ≤ 1
h
{
E
[∫ t+h
t
f0(u,X0u, α
0, µu)du+Φ(t+ h,X
0
t+h, µt+h)|X0t = i0, µ = x
]
− Φ(t, i0, x)
}
Using the infinitesimal generator of the process (X0u, µu), the RHS of the above inequality has a limit.
Take the limit and take the infimum over α, we obtain:
lim sup
h→0
Ih ≤ ∂tΦ(t, i0, x) + inf
α0∈A0
{
f0(t, i0, α0, x) + (1−
M−1∑
k=1
xk)
M−1∑
k=1
∂xkΦ(t, i
0, x)q(t,M, k, φ(t,M, i0 , x), i0, α0, x)
+
M−1∑
i,j=1
∂xjΦ(t, i
0, x)xiq(t, i, j, φ(t, i, i
0 , x), i0, α0, x) +
∑
j0 6=i0
[Φ(t, j0, x)− Φ(t, i0, x)]q0(i0, j0, α0, x)
}
On the other hand, for all h > 0, there exists a control φ0h such that
E
[∫ t+h
t
f0(u,X0u, φ
0
h(u,X
0
u, µu), µu)du+Φ(t+ h,X
0
t+h, µt+h)|X0t = i0, µ = x
]
≤ Tt,t+hΦ(t+h, ·, ·))(i0, x)+h2
This implies:
Ih ≥ 1
h
{
E
[∫ t+h
t
f0(u,X0u, φ
0
h(u,X
0
u, µu), µu)du+Φ(t+ h,X
0
t+h, µt+h)|X0t = i0, µ = x
]
− Φ(t, i0, x)
}
−h
Since Φ(·, j0, ·) is C1 for all j0, this can be further written using the infinitesimal generator:
Ih ≥ 1
h
E
[∫ t+h
t
f0(u,X0u, α
h(u,X0u, µu), µu) + [G0φ0
h
,φΦ](u,X
0
u, µu)du|X0t = i0, µ = x
]
− h
Taking supremum over the control and applying Dominated Convergence Theorem, we obtain:
lim inf
h→0
Ih ≥ ∂tΦ(t, i0, x) + inf
α0∈A0
{
f0(t, i0, α0, x) + (1−
M−1∑
k=1
xk)
M−1∑
k=1
∂xkΦ(t, i
0, x)q(t,M, k, φ(t,M, i0 , x), i0, α0, x)
+
M−1∑
i,j=1
∂xjΦ(t, i
0, x)xiq(t, i, j, φ(t, i, i
0 , x), i0, α0, x) +
∑
j0 6=i0
[Φ(t, j0, x)− Φ(t, i0, x)]q0(i0, j0, α0, x)
}
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This proves the lemma for Φ such that Φ(·, j0, ·) is C1 for all j0.
(ii) Now take a continuous mapping Φ and only assume that Φ(·, i0, ·) is C1. Applying Weierstrass
approximation theorem, for any ǫ > 0, there exists C1 function φǫj0 on [0, T ]×P for all j0 6= i0 such that
sup
(t,x)∈[0,T ]×P
|Φ(t, j0, x)− φǫj0(t, x)| ≤ ǫ
Define Φǫ(t, j0, x) := φǫj0(t, x) + ǫ for j
0 6= i0 and Φǫ(t, i0, x) := Φ(t, i0, x). Then we have Φǫ ≥ Φ. By the
monotonicity of the operator Tt,t+h we have:
1
h
{
[Tt,t+hΦǫ(t+ h, ·, ·)](i0, x)− Φǫ(t, i0, x)
} ≥ 1
h
{
[Tt,t+hΦ(t+ h, ·, ·)](i0 , x)− Φ(t, i0, x)
}
:= Ih
Now apply the results from step (i), we obtain
lim sup
h→0
Ih
≤ ∂tΦǫ(t, i0, x) + inf
α0∈A0
{
f0(t, i0, α0, x) + (1−
M−1∑
k=1
xk)
M−1∑
k=1
∂xkΦ
ǫ(t, i0, x)q(t,M, k, φ(t,M, i0 , x), i0, α0, x)
+
M−1∑
i,j=1
∂xjΦ
ǫ(t, i0, x)xiq(t, i, j, φ(t, i, i
0 , x), i0, α0, x) +
∑
j0 6=i0
[Φǫ(t, j0, x)− Φǫ(t, i0, x)]q0(t, i0, j0, α0, x)
}
= ∂tΦ(t, i
0, x) + inf
α0∈A0
{
f0(t, i0, α0, x) + (1−
M−1∑
k=1
xk)
M−1∑
k=1
∂xkΦ(t, i
0, x)q(t,M, k, φ(t,M, i0 , x), i0, α0, x)
+
M−1∑
i,j=1
∂xjΦ(t, i
0, x)xiq(t, i, j, φ(t, i, i
0 , x), i0, α0, x)
+
∑
j0 6=i0
[Φǫ(t, j0, x)− Φ(t, j0, x) + Φ(t, j0, x)− Φ(t, i0, x)]q0(t, i0, j0, α0, x)
}
≤ ∂tΦ(t, i0, x) + inf
α0∈A0
{
f0(t, i0, α0, x) + (1−
M−1∑
k=1
xk)
M−1∑
k=1
∂xkΦ(t, i
0, x)q(t,M, k, φ(t,M, i0 , x), i0, α0, x)
+
M−1∑
i,j=1
∂xjΦ(t, i
0, x)xiq(t, i, j, φ(t, i, i
0 , x), i0, α0, x) +
∑
j0 6=i0
[Φ(t, j0, x)− Φ(t, i0, x)]q0(t, i0, j0, α0, x)
}
+ ǫL
The last equality is due to the fact that q0 is bounded and |Φǫ(t, j0, x) − Φ(t, j0, x)| ≤ ǫ. We can write
a similar inequality for lim infh→0 Ih. Then tending ǫ to 0 yields the desired result.
9.2 Proof of Theorem 4
In this section we present the proof of the comparison principle for HJB equation associated with major
player’s optimization problem. The arguments used in this proof can be readily applied to prove unique-
ness of solution to minor player’s HJB equation (6) (c.f. Theorem 5). The same argument can also be
used to prove the uniqueness result for equations (7) and (8) (c.f. Proposition 2).
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Let v and w be respectively viscosity subsolution and supersolution to equation (4). Our objective is
to show v(t, i, x) ≤ w(t, i, x) for all 1 ≤ i ≤M0, x ∈ P and t ∈ [0, T ].
(i) Without loss of generality, we may assume that v is a viscosity subsolution of:
0 = − η + ∂tv0(t, i0, x) + inf
α0∈A0
{
f0(t, i0, α0, x) +
∑
j0 6=i0
[v0(t, j0, x)− v0(t, i0, x)]q0(t, i0, j0, α0, x)
+ (1−
M−1∑
k=1
xk)
M−1∑
k=1
∂xkv
0(t, i0, x)q(t,M, k, φ(t,M, i0 , x), i0, α0, x)
+
M−1∑
i,j=1
∂xjv
0(t, i0, x)xiq(t, i, j, φ(t, i, i
0 , x), i0, α0, x)
}
, ∀(i0, t, x) ∈ {1, . . . ,M0} × [0, T [×P
0 = v0(T, i0, x)− g0(i0, x), ∀x ∈ P
(24)
where η > 0 is a small parameter. Indeed we may consider the function vη(t, i, x) := v(t, i, x)− η(T − t).
Then it is easy to see that vη is a viscosity subsolution to the above equation. If we can prove vη ≤ w,
the tending η to 0 yields v ≤ w. In the following, we will only consider the subsolution v to equation (24)
and the supersolution w to the equation (4), and try to prove v ≤ w.
(ii) For ǫ > 0 and 1 ≤ i0 ≤M0, consider the function Γi0,ǫ defined on [0, T ]2 × P2:
Γi0,ǫ(t, s, x, y) := v(t, i
0, x)− w(s, i0, y)− 1
ǫ
|t− s|2 − 1
ǫ
‖x− y‖2
where ‖ · ‖ is the euclidian norm on R(M0−1). Since Γi0,ǫ is a continuous function on a compact set, it
attains the maximum denote as Ni0,ǫ. Denote (t¯, s¯, x¯, y¯) the maximizer (which obviously depends on ǫ
and i0, but for simplicity of the notation we suppress the notation). We show that for all 1 ≤ i0 ≤ M0,
there exists a sequence ǫn → 0 and the corresponding maximizer (t¯n, s¯n, x¯n, y¯n) such that
(t¯n, s¯n, x¯n, y¯n)→ (tˆ, tˆ, xˆ, xˆ),where (tˆ, xˆ) := arg sup
(t,x)∈[0,T ]×P
{v(t, i0, x)− w(t, i0, x)} (25a)
1
ǫn
|t¯n − s¯n|2 + 1
ǫn
‖x¯n − y¯n‖2 → 0 (25b)
Ni0,ǫ → Ni0 := sup
(t,x)∈[0,T ]×P
{v(t, i0, x)− w(t, i0, x)} (25c)
Indeed for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × P, we have v(t, i0, x) − w(t, i0, x) = Γi0,ǫ(t, t, x, x) ≤ Ni0,ǫ. Taking the
supremum we obtain Ni0 ≤ Ni0,ǫ and therefore
1
ǫ
|t¯− s¯|2 + 1
ǫ
‖x¯− y¯‖2 ≤ v(t¯, i0, x¯)− w(s¯, i0, y¯)−Ni0 ≤ 2L−Ni0
The last inequality comes from the fact that v and w are bounded on the compact [0, T ] × P. It follows
that |t¯− s¯|2 + ‖x¯− y¯‖2 → 0. Now since the sequence (t¯, s¯, x¯, y¯) (indexed by ǫ) is in the compact, we can
extract a subsequence ǫn → 0 such that (t¯n, s¯n, x¯n, y¯n)→ (tˆ, tˆ, xˆ, xˆ). We have the following inequality:
Ni ≤ v(t¯n, i0, x¯n)− w(s¯n, i0, y¯n)− 1
ǫn
|t¯n − s¯n|2 − 1
ǫn
‖x¯n − y¯n‖2 = Ni0,ǫn ≤ v(t¯n, i0, x¯n)− w(s¯n, i0, y¯n)
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Notice that v(t¯n, i
0, x¯n)−w(s¯n, i0, y¯n)→ v(tˆ, i0, xˆn)−w(tˆ, i0, xˆn) ≤ Ni0 , we deduce thatNi0 = v(tˆ, i0, xˆn)−
w(tˆ, i0, xˆn) which implies (25a). (25b) and (25c) follows easily by taking the limit in the above inequality.
(iii) Now we prove the comparison principle. Using the notation introduced in step (ii), we need to prove
Ni0 ≤ 0 for all 1 ≤ i0 ≤M0. Assume that there exists 1 ≤ i0 ≤M0 such that
Ni0 = sup
1≤j0≤M0
Nj0 > 0
We work towards a contradiction. Without loss of generality we assume that Ni0 > Nj0 for all j 6= i.
We then consider the subsequence (ǫn, t¯n, s¯n, x¯n, y¯n)→ (0, tˆ, tˆ, xˆ, xˆ) with regard to i0 constructed in step
(ii), for which (25a), (25b) and (25c) are satisfied. Since v(tˆ, i0, xˆ)−w(tˆ, i0, xˆ) = Ni0 > 0, we have tˆ 6= T .
Instead of extracting a subsequence, we may assume that t¯n 6= T and s¯n 6= T for all n ≥ 0. Moreover for
any j0 6= i0, we have
v(tˆ, j0, xˆ)− w(tˆ, j0, xˆ) ≤ Nj < Ni = v(tˆ, i0, xˆ)− w(tˆ, i0, xˆ)
Since v(t¯n, j
0, x¯n) − w(s¯n, j0, y¯n) → v(tˆ, j0, xˆ) − w(tˆ, j0, xˆ), instead of extracting a subsequence, we can
assume that for all j0 6= i0 and n ≥ 0,
v(t¯n, j
0, x¯n)−w(s¯n, j0, y¯n) ≤ v(t¯n, i0, x¯n)− w(s¯n, i0, y¯n) (26)
In the following we suppress the index n for the sequence (ǫn, t¯n, s¯n, x¯n, y¯n) for sake of simplicity of
notation. By definition of the maximizer, for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× P, we have:
v(t, i0, x)−w(s¯, i0, y¯)− 1
ǫ
‖x− y¯‖2 − 1
ǫ
|t− s¯|2 ≤ v(t¯, i0, x¯)− w(s¯, i0, y¯)− 1
ǫ
‖x¯− y¯‖2 − 1
ǫ
|t¯− s¯|2
Therefore v(·, i0, ·)− φ attains maximum at (t¯, x¯) where
φ(t, x) :=
1
ǫ
‖x− y¯‖2 + 1
ǫ
|t− s¯|2 ∂tφ(t¯, x¯) = 2
ǫ
(t¯− s¯) ∇φ(t¯, x¯) = 2
ǫ
(x¯− y¯) (27)
Similarly w(·, i0, ·)− ψ attains minimum at (s¯, y¯) where
ψ(t, x) := −1
ǫ
‖x− x¯‖2 − 1
ǫ
|t− t¯|2 ∂tψ(s¯, y¯) = 2
ǫ
(t¯− s¯) ∇ψ(s¯, y¯) = 2
ǫ
(x¯− y¯) (28)
Since s¯ 6= T and t¯ 6= T , the definition of viscosity solution and (27), (28) gives the following inequalities:
η ≤ 2
ǫ
(t¯− s¯) + inf
α0∈A0
{
f0(t¯, i0, α0, x¯) + (1−
M−1∑
k=1
x¯k)
M−1∑
k=1
2
ǫ
(x¯k − y¯k)q(t¯,M, k, φ(t¯,M, i0 , x¯), i0, α0, x¯)
+
M−1∑
i,j=1
2
ǫ
(x¯j − y¯j)x¯iq(t¯, i, j, φ(t¯, i, i0 , x¯), i0, α0, x¯) +
∑
j0 6=i0
[v(t¯, j0, x¯)− v(t¯, i0, x¯)]q0(t¯, i0, j0, α0, x¯)
}
0 ≥ 2
ǫ
(t¯− s¯) + inf
α0∈A0
{f0(s¯, i0, α0, y¯) + (1−
M−1∑
k=1
y¯k)
M−1∑
k=1
2
ǫ
(x¯k − y¯k)q(s¯,M, k, φ(s¯,M, i0 , y¯), i0, α0, y¯)
+
M−1∑
i,j=1
2
ǫ
(x¯j − y¯j)y¯iq(s¯, i, j, φ(s¯, i, i0 , y¯), i0, α0, y¯) +
∑
j0 6=i0
[w(s¯, j0, y¯)− w(s¯, i0, y¯)]q0(s¯, i0, j0, α0, y¯)
}
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Substracting the above two inequalities, we obtain:
0 < η ≤ I1 + I2 + I3 (29)
where the three terms I1, I2 and I3 will be dealt with in the following. For I1 we have:
I1 := sup
α0∈A0
{f0(t¯, i0, α0, x¯)− f0(s¯, i0, α0, y¯)}
+ sup
α0∈A0
{
∑
j0 6=i0
[v(t¯, j0, x¯)− v(t¯, i0, x¯)]q0(t¯, i0, j0, α0, x¯)−
∑
j0 6=i0
[w(s¯, j0, y¯)− w(s¯, i0, y¯)]q0(s¯, i0, j0, α0, y¯)}
≤ sup
α0∈A0
{f0(t¯, i0, α0, x¯)− f0(s¯, i0, α0, y¯)}
+ sup
α0∈A0
{
∑
j0 6=i0
[v(t¯, j0, x¯)− v(t¯, i0, x¯)](q0(t¯, i0, j0, α0, x¯)− q0(s¯, i0, j0, α0, y¯))}
+ sup
α0∈A0
{
∑
j0 6=i0
[v(t¯, j0, x¯)− w(s¯, j0, y¯)− v(t¯, i0, x¯) + w(s¯, i0, y¯)]q0(s¯, i0, j0, α0, y¯)}
≤ L(|t¯− s¯|+ ‖x¯− y¯‖) + 2CL(|t¯− s¯|+ ‖x¯− y¯‖) + 0
In the last inequality we use (26) and the fact that q0(s¯, i0, j0, α0, y¯) ≥ 0 for j0 6= i0. We also use the
Lipschitz property of f0 and q0. Now in light of (25a), we obtain I1 → 0 as ǫ→ 0. Now turning to I2:
I2 := sup
α0∈A0
{M−1∑
i,j=1
2
ǫ
(x¯j − y¯j)
[
x¯iq(t¯, i, j, φ(t¯, i, i
0 , x¯), i0, α0, x¯)− y¯iq(s¯, i, j, φ(s¯, i, i0 , y¯), i0, α0, y¯)
]}
≤ sup
α0∈A0
{M−1∑
i,j=1
2
ǫ
|(x¯j − y¯j)(x¯i − y¯i)q(t¯, i, j, φ(t¯, i, i0 , x¯), i0, α0, x¯)|
}
+ sup
α0∈A0
{M−1∑
i,j=1
2
ǫ
|y¯i(x¯j − y¯j)(q(t¯, i, j, φ(t¯, i, i0 , α0, x¯), i0, α0, x¯)− q(s¯, i, j, φ(s¯, i, i0 , y¯), i0, α0, y¯))|
}
≤
M−1∑
i,j=1
2
ǫ
C|x¯j − y¯j||x¯i − y¯i|+
M−1∑
j=1
2
ǫ
|x¯j − y¯j|L(M − 1)(|t¯− s¯|+ ‖x¯− y¯‖)
where in the last inequality we used the Lipschitz property of q and φ uniformly in α, as well as the
boundedness of the function q. It follows that I2 ≤ C 1ǫ (|t¯ − s¯|2 + ‖x¯ − y¯‖2) and by (25b) we see that
I2 → 0 as ǫ→ 0. Finally we deal with I3, which is defined by:
I3 := sup
α0∈A0
{
(1−
M−1∑
k=1
x¯k)
M−1∑
k=1
2
ǫ
(x¯k − y¯k)q(t¯,M, k, φ(t¯,M, i0 , x¯), i0, α0, x¯)
− (1−
M−1∑
k=1
y¯k)
M−1∑
k=1
2
ǫ
(x¯k − y¯k)q(s¯,M, k, φ(s¯,M, i0 , y¯), i0, α0, y¯)
}
Using a similar estimation as for I2, we obtain I3 ≤ C 1ǫ (|t¯− s¯|2 + ‖x¯− y¯‖2). Therefore by tending ǫ to 0
in the inequality (29), we obtain a contradiction. This completes the proof.
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9.3 Proof of Lemma 3
The main tool we use for the proof is the theory of limit operation on viscosity solution. We refer the
reader to [16] for an introductory presentation of limit operation on viscosity solution to non-linear second
order PDE. Here we adapt the results established therein to the case of coupled system of non-linear first
order PDE, which is the HJB equation we are interested in throughout the paper. Let O be some locally
compact subset of Rd and (Fn)n≥0 be a sequence of functions defined on {1, . . . ,M} ×O. We define the
limit operator lim sup∗ and lim inf∗ as follow:
lim sup∗Fn(i, x) := lim
n→+∞,ǫ→0
sup{Fk(i, y)|k ≥ n, ‖y − x‖ ≤ ǫ}
lim inf∗Fn(i, x) := lim
n→+∞,ǫ→0
inf{Fk(i, y)|k ≥ n, ‖y − x‖ ≤ ǫ}
Intuitively, we expect that the limit of a sequence of viscosity solutions solves the limiting PDE. It turns
out that this is the proper definition of the limit operation, as is stated in the following lemma:
Lemma 6. Let O be a locally compact subset of Rd, (un)n≥0 be a sequence of continuous functions defined
on {1, . . . ,M}×O and Hn be a sequence of functions defined on {1, . . . ,M}× [0, T ]×O×RM ×Rd, such
that for each n, un is viscosity solutions to the system of PDEs Hn(i, t, x, u, ∂tu(·, i, ·),∇u(·, i, ·)) = 0,∀1 ≤
i ≤M , in the sense of Definition 1. Assume that for each i, x, d, p, the mapping u→ H(i, t, x, u, d, p) is
non-decreasing in the j-th component of u, for all j 6= i. Then u∗ := lim sup∗ un (resp. u∗ := lim inf∗ un)
is viscosity subsolution (resp. supersolution) to H∗(i, t, x, u, ∂tu(i, ·),∇u(i, ·)) = 0,∀1 ≤ i ≤ M (resp.
H∗(i, t, x, u, ∂tu(·, ·, i, ·),∇u(·, ·, i, ·)) = 0,∀1 ≤ i ≤M).
The proof requires the definition of viscosity subsolution and supersolution based on the notion of
first-order subjet and superjet (see definition 2.2 in [16]). Let u be a continuous function defined on
[0, T ]× {1, . . . ,M} × O, we define the first order superjet of u on (t, i, x) to be:
J+u(t, i, x) := {(d, p) ∈ R×Rd : u(s, i, y) ≤ u(t, i, x)+d(s−t)+(y−x)p+o(|t−s|+‖y−x‖), (s, y) → (t, x)}
Then u is a viscosity subsolution (resp. supersolution) to the system H(i, t, x, u, ∂tu(i, ·),∇u(i, ·)) = 0 if
only if for all (i, t, x) and (d, p) ∈ J +u(t, i, x) (resp. (d, p) ∈ J−u(t, i, x)), we have H(i, t, x, u, d, p) ≥ 0
(resp. H(i, t, x, u, d, p) ≤ 0).
Proof. Fix (t, i, x) ∈ [0, T ]× {1, . . . ,M} × O and let (d, p) ∈ J +u∗(t, i, x). We want to show that:
H∗(i, t, x, u∗(t, ·, x), d, p) ≥ 0
where u∗(t, ·, x) represents the M−dimensional vector [u∗(t, k, x)]1≤k≤M . By lemma 6.1., there exists a
sequence nj → +∞, xj ∈ O, (dj , pj) ∈ J+unj (tj, i, xj) such that:
(tj, xj , unj (tj , i, xj), dj , pj)→ (t, x, u∗(t, i, x), d, p), j → +∞
Since un is viscosity subsolution to Hn = 0, we have
Hnj(i, tj , xj, unj (tj , ·, xj), dj , pj) ≥ 0
Now let us denote
Sun,ǫ(t, k, x) := sup{uj(s, k, y),max(|s− t|, ‖y − x‖) ≤ ǫ, j ≥ n}
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Then we have u∗(t, i, x) = limn→+∞,ǫ→0 S
u
n,ǫ(t, i, x). Fix δ > 0, then there exists ǫ
0 > 0 and N0 > 0 such
that for all ǫ ≤ ǫ0 and j ≥ N0, we have
|Sunj ,ǫ(t, k, x) − u∗(t, k, x)| ≤ δ, ∀k 6= i
Moreover, there exists N > 0 such that for all j ≥ N ,
‖(tj , xj , unj (tj , i, xj), dj , pj)− (t, x, u∗(t, i, x), d, p)‖ ≤ δ ∧ ǫ0
Then for any j ≥ N0 ∨ N , we have ‖(tj , xj) − (t, x)‖ ≤ ǫ0, and by definition of Suǫ,n we deduce that
unj (tj, k, xj) ≤ Sunj ,ǫ0(t, k, x) for all k 6= i. By the monotonicity property of Hnj , we have:
Hnj(i, tj , xj , S
u
nj ,ǫ0
(t, 1, x), . . . , Sunj ,ǫ0(t, i−1, x), unj (tj , i, xj), Sunj ,ǫ0(t, i+1, x), . . . , Sunj ,ǫ0(t,M, x), dj , pj) ≥ 0
Now in the above inequality, all the arguments of Hnj except i is located in a ball of radius δ centered
on the point (t, x, u∗(t, ·, x), d, p). We have thus
SHnj ,δ(i, t, x, u
∗(t, ·, x), d, p) ≥ 0
where we have defined:
SHn,δ(i, t, x, u, d, p) := sup{Hj(i, s, y, v, e, q), ‖(s, y, v, e, q) − (t, x, u, d, p)‖ ≤ ǫ, j ≥ n}
We have just proved that for any δ > 0, there exists M > 0 such that for any j ≥ M , we have
SHnj ,δ(i, t, x, u
∗(t, ·, x), d, p) ≥ 0. Since we have
H∗(i, t, x, , u∗(t, ·, x), d, p) = lim
n→+∞,ǫ→0
SHnj ,δ(i, t, x, u
∗(t, ·, x), d, p)
We deduce that H∗(i, t, x, , u∗(t, ·, x), d, p) ≥ 0.
Now going back to the proof of Lemma 3, we consider a converging sequence of elements (φ0n, φn) →
(φ0, φ) in K, where we have defined K to be the collection of major and minor player’s controls (φ0, φ)
that are L−Lipschitz in (t, x). We denote V 0n (resp. V 0) the value function of major player’s control
problem associated with the controls φn (resp. φ). We also use the notation V
0∗ := lim supV 0n and
V 0∗ := lim inf V
0
n . For all n ≥ 0, we define the operator Hn:
H0n(i
0, t, x, u, d, p) := d+ inf
α0∈A0
{
f0(t, i0, α0, x) +
∑
j0 6=i0
(uj0 − ui0)q0(t, i0, j0, α0, x)
+ (1−
M∑
k=1
xk)
M−1∑
k=1
pkq(t,M, k, φn(t,M, i
0, x), i0, α0, x) +
M−1∑
k,l=1
plxkq(t, k, l, φn(t, k, i
0, x), i0, α0, x)
}
, if t < T
H0n(i
0, T, x, u, d, p) := g0(i0, x)− ui0
Then V 0n is viscosity solution to the equation H
0
n = 0. It is clear to see that the operator H
0
n satisfies the
monotonicity condition in Lemma 6. To evaluate H0∗ := lim supH0n and H
0
∗ := lim inf H
0
n, we remark
that for each 1 ≤ i0 ≤M0, the sequence of functions (t, x, u, d, p)→ Hn(i0, t, x, u, d, p) is equicontinuous.
Indeed, this is due to the fact that the sequence φn is equicontinuous and the function q is Lipschitz.
Therefore H0∗ and H0∗ are simply the limit in the pointwise sense when t < T . When t = T , the boundary
condition needs to be taken into account. The following computation is straightforward to verify:
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Lemma 7. Define the operator H0 as:
H0(i0, t, x, u, d, p) := d+ inf
α0∈A0
{
f0(t, i0, α0, x) +
∑
j0 6=i0
(uj0 − ui0)q0(t, i0, j0, α0, x)
+ (1−
M∑
k=1
xk)
M−1∑
k=1
pkq(t,M, k, φ(t,M, i
0, x), i0, α0, x) +
M−1∑
k,l=1
plxkq(t, k, l, φ(t, k, i
0, x), i0, α0, x)
}
, ∀t ≤ T
Then we have:
H0∗(i0, t, x, u, d, p) = H0∗(i0, t, x, u, d, p) = H0(i0, t, x, u, d, p), if t < T
H0∗(i0, T, x, u, d, p) = max{(g0(i0, x)− ui0), H0∗(i0, t, x, u, d, p)}
H0∗ (i
0, T, x, u, d, p) = min{(g0(i0, x)− ui0), H0∗(i0, t, x, u, d, p)}
From the proof of Theorem 3, we see immediately that V 0 is a viscosity subsolution (resp. superso-
lution) of H0,∗ = 0 (resp. H0∗ = 0). By Lemma 7, V
0∗ (resp. V 0∗ ) is a viscosity subsolution of H
0,∗ = 0
(resp. supersolution of H0∗ = 0). Indeed, following exactly the proof of Theorem 4, we can show that a
viscosity supersolution of H0∗ = 0 is greater than a viscosity subsolution of H
0,∗ = 0. By definition of
lim sup and lim inf, we have V 0,∗ ≥ V 0∗ . It follows that V 0 ≤ V 0∗ ≤ V 0,∗ ≤ V 0, and therefore we have
lim supV 0n = lim infH
0
n = V
0. Then we obtain the uniform convergence of V 0n to V
0 following Remark
6.4 in [16].
9.4 Proof of Proposition 6 & 7
We use the similar techniques as in [10] where the author provides gradient estimates for N-player game
without major player. Let us first remark that the system of ODEs (13) can be written in the following
form:
−θ˙m(t) = fm(t) +
∑
m′ 6=m
am′m(t)(θm′ − θm), θm(T ) = bm
where we denote the index m := (i0, x) ∈ {1, . . . ,M0}×PN and we notice that am′m ≥ 0 for all m′ 6= m.
This can be further written in the compact form:
− θ˙(t) = f(t) +M(t)θ, θ(T ) = b (30)
where M is a matrix indexed by m, with all off-diagonal entries being positive and the sum of every row
equals 0. Define ‖ · ‖ to be the uniform norm of a vector: ‖b‖ := maxm |bm|. Instead of proving (i) in
Proposition 6, we prove a more general result, which is a consequence of Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 in [10].
Lemma 8. Let φ be a solution to the ODE (30). Assume f is bounded then we have
‖θ(t)‖ ≤
∫ T
t
‖f(s)‖ds + ‖b‖
Proof. For any t ≤ s ≤ T we denote the matrix K(t, s) as the solution of the following system:
dK(t, s)
dt
= −M(t)K(t, s), K(s, s) = I
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where I stand for the identity matrix. Now for θ, we clearly have
−θ˙(s) = f(s) +M(s)θ(s) ≤ ‖f(s)‖e+M(s)θ(s)
where we denote e to be the vector with all the components equal to 1. Then using Lemma 5 in [10], we
have
−K(t, s)θ˙(s) ≤ K(t, s)M(t)θ(s) + ‖f(s)‖K(t, s)e
Note that K(t, s)θ˙(s) + K(t, s)M(t)θ(s) = ddsK(t, s)θ(s). We integrate the above inequality between t
and T to obtain:
θ(t) ≤ K(t, T )b+
∫ T
t
‖f(s)‖K(t, s)e ds
Now using Lemma 4 in [10], we have ‖K(t, T )b‖ ≤ ‖b‖ and ‖K(t, T )e‖ ≤ ‖e‖ = 1. This implies that:
max
m
θm(t) ≤ ‖b‖+
∫ T
t
‖f(s)‖ds
Indeed starting from the inequality θ˙(s) ≥ −‖f(s)‖e +M(s)φ(s) and going through the same steps we
obtain:
min
m
θm(t) ≥ −‖b‖ −
∫ T
t
‖f(s)‖ds
The desired inequality follows.
Now we turn to the proof of Proposition 6. Let θ be the unique solution to the system of ODEs (13).
Recall the notation eij := 1j 6=Mej − 1i 6=Mei. For any k 6= l and define z(t, i0, x, k, l) := θ(t, i0, x +
1
N ekl) − θ(t, i0, x). Then z(t, ·, ·, ·, ·) can be viewed as a vector indexed by i0, x, k, l. Substracting the
ODEs satisfied by θ(t, i0, x+ 1N ekl) and θ(t, i
0, x), we obtain that z solves the following system of ODEs:
−z˙(t, i0, x, k, l) =F (t, i0, x, k, l) +
∑
j0,j0 6=i0
(z(t, j0, x, k, l) − z(t, i0, x, k, l))q0φ0(t, i0, j0, x)
+
∑
(i,j),j 6=i
(z(t, i0, x+
1
N
eij , k, l) − z(t, i0, x, k, l))Nxiqφ(t, i, i0, x)
z(T, i0, x, k, l) =g0(i0, x+
1
N
ekl)− g0(i0, x)
(31)
Where we have defined the F to be:
F (t, i0, x, k, l) := f0φ0(t, i
0, x+
1
N
ekl)− f0φ0(t, i0, x)
+
∑
j0,j0 6=i0
[θ(t, j0, x+
1
N
ekl)− θ(t, i0, x+ 1
N
ekl)][q
0
φ0(t, i
0, j0, x+
1
N
ekl)− q0φ0(t, i0, j0, x)]
+
∑
(i,j),j 6=i
[θ(t, i0, x+
1
N
eij +
1
N
ekl)− θ(t, i0, x+ 1
N
ekl)]
×N [(x+ 1
N
ekl)iqφ(t, i, j, i
0, x+
1
N
ekl)− xiqφ(t, i, j, i0, x)]
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Then by the uniform bound provided in Lemma 8, together with the Lipschitz property of f0, g0, q0, q, α, β,
we have:
‖F (t)‖ ≤ L
N
+ 2(T‖f0‖∞ + ‖g0‖∞) L
N
+ ‖z(t)‖ · L, ‖z(T )‖ ≤ L
N
Where L is a generic Lipschitz constant. Now we are ready to apply Lemma 8 to (31). We have for all
t ≤ T
‖z(t)‖ ≤ L
N
+
∫ T
t
(
C
N
+ L‖z(s)‖)ds
Where C is a constant only depending on T,L, ‖f0‖∞, ‖g0‖∞. Finally the Gronwall’s inequality allows
to conclude.
The proof of Proposition 7 is similar. We consider the solution θ to the ODE (14) and we keep the
notation z(t, i0, x, k, l) as before. For v ∈ RM0 , x ∈ P, t ≤ T and i0 = 1, . . . ,M0, denote:
h0(t, i0, x, v) := inf
α0∈A0
{f0(t, α0, i0, x) +
∑
j0 6=i0
(vj0 − vi0)q0(t, i0, j0, α0, x)}
Then for all x, y ∈ P, u, v ∈ RM0 , using the Lipschitz property of f0 and q0 and the boundedness of q0,
we have
|h0(t, i0, x, v)− h0(t, i0, y, u)| ≤ L|x− y|+2(M0 − 1)max{‖u‖, ‖v‖}‖x− y‖+Cq2(M0 − 1)‖v − u‖ (32)
Substracting the ODEs satisfied by θ(t, i0, x+ 1N ekl) and θ(t, i
0, x), we obtain that z solves the following
system of ODEs:
−z˙(t, i0, x, k, l) =F (t, i0, x, k, l) +
∑
(i,j),j 6=i
(z(t, i0, x+
1
N
eij , k, l)− z(t, i0, x, k, l))Nxiqφ(t, i, j, i0, x)
z(T, i0, x, k, l) =g0(i0, x+
1
N
ekl)− g0(i0, x)
where F is given by:
F (t, i0, x, k, l) :=h(t, i0, x+
1
N
ekl, θ(t, ·, x+ 1
N
ekl))− h(t, i0, x, θ(t, ·, x))
+
∑
(i,j),j 6=i
[θ(t, i0, x+
1
N
eij +
1
N
ekl)− θ(t, i0, x+ 1
N
ekl)]
×N [(x+ 1
N
ekl)iqφ(t, i, j, i
0, x+
1
N
ekl)− xiqφ(t, i, j, i0, x)]
By the estimation (32), the uniform bound provided in Lemma 8, together with the Lipschitz property
of f0, g0, q0, q, φ0, φ, we have:
‖F (t)‖ ≤ 1
N
(L+ 2(M0 − 1)(T‖f‖0∞ + ‖g‖0∞)) + 2Cq(M0 − 1)‖z(t)‖ +M(M − 1)(LφL+ Cq)‖z(t)‖
We apply Lemma 8 to obtain:
‖z(t)‖ ≤ L
N
+
∫ T
t
(M(M − 1)(LφL+ Cq) + 2Cq(M0 − 1))‖z(s)‖ + 1
N
(L+ 2(M0 − 1)(T‖f‖0∞ + ‖g‖0∞))ds
:=
C0 + C1T + C2T
2
N
+
∫ T
t
(C3 +C4Lφ)‖z(s)‖ds
The Gronwall’s inequality allows to conclude.
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